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ABSTRACT 
POLITICALLY CONNECTED FIRMS AND CONNECTED INDIVIDUALS IN 
TURKEY 
Ezgi ġiir Kıbrıs 
 This research provides a descriptive analysis of politically connected firms and 
connected individuals in Turkey from 1998 to 2015. The data of parliamentarians 
between the 18
th
 and 24
th
 legislative periods of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey 
and the data of boards of directors collected from the Istanbul Stock Market and Public 
Disclosure Platform are utilized for identifying businessman politicians, politician 
businessmen and politically connected firms in Turkey. 
Relying on Faccio’s method of direct connections, the study defines a firm as 
politically connected if at least one of the members of the board of directors is a 
parliamentarian; or at least one of the members of the board of the directors was a 
parliamentarian; or a former member of the board of the directors enters into the 
parliament. In this study, among 694 firms traded in the Stock Market Ġstanbul 
politically connected firms according to years, sectors and parties are stated. Then, 
politically connected individuals are displayed for understanding which parties have 
more businessmen individuals, which parliamentary committee these individuals are 
and if there are ministers among them. The thesis at the end, aims to reveal the change 
and continuity in the relationship between business and politics in Turkey across 
different political parties from the 1980s on. 
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ÖZET 
TÜRKĠYE’DE SĠYASĠ BAĞLANTILI FĠRMALAR VE BAĞLANTILI KĠġĠLER 
Ezgi ġiir Kıbrıs 
Bu çalıĢma Türkiye’de 1998 ve 2015 yılları arasındaki siyasi bağlantılı 
firmaların ve bağlantılı kiĢilerin betimsel bir analizini sunmaktadır. Politikacı iĢ 
adamları, iĢ adamı politikacılar ve siyasi bağlantılı Ģirketlerin tanımlanması için18.ve 
24. dönemler arasındaki milletvekillerine ait veriler Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nden, 
firmaların yönetim kurulları ile ilgili veriler ise Borsa Ġstanbul ve Kamu Aydınlatma 
Platformu’ndan elde edilmiĢtir. 
ÇalıĢmada, “siyasi bağlantılı firma” Faccio’nun doğrudan bağlantılar yöntemine 
dayanılarak tanımlanmıĢtır. Buna göre eğer bir Ģirketin halihazırdaki yönetim kurulu 
üyelerinden en az biri milletvekili ise ya da daha önce milletvekilliği yaptıysa veya bir 
Ģirketin eski yönetim kurulu üyelerinden en az biri daha sonra parlamentoya girmiĢ ise o 
Ģirket siyasi bağlantılıdır. Bu bağlantıları bulmak için Borsa Ġstanbul’da 1998 ve 2015 
yılları arasında iĢlem gören 694 adet farklı firma incelenmiĢ; siyasi bağlantılı firmalar 
yıllara, sektörlere ve partilere göre gösterilmiĢtir. Ardından, bağlantılı kiĢilerin hangi 
partilerde oldukları, mecliste hangi komisyonlarda yer aldıkları ve hükümette görev alıp 
almadıkları belirtilmiĢtir. Tez, sonuç olarak 1980 sonrası dönemde siyaset ve iĢ dünyası 
iliĢkilerinin siyasal partilerle bağlantılı olarak değiĢimini ve sürekliliğini göstermeyi 
amaçlamaktadır. 
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INTRODUCTION: 
Although the literature regarding politically connected firms is new, the issue of 
politically connected firms is not. For instance, almost one out seven firms in the Berlin 
Stock Exchange was politically connected with the Nazi Party in 1933.
1
 A second 
example is about Turkish business entrepreneurs. Buğra argues that many members of 
the Ġttihat ve Terakki Fırkası were the first entrepreneurs in the Ottoman Era. The 
members sat on the boards of directors of the banks and joint-stock companies at that 
time.
2
 Another example is from Mexico and Brazil during the period between 1890 and 
1915. Through a network analysis of joint stock companies and government politicians 
in Brazil and Mexico, Musacchio and Read declare that there were links between 
politicians and firms.
3
 
Connections between politics and business can be established through direct or 
indirect relations between politicians and businessmen. Direct relations between state 
and business can be observed when politicians enter into business or businessmen 
become politicians. This phenomenon is known as the “revolving door.”Revolving door 
cases occur when an individual who has worked in private sector enters into the public 
sector. Also (reverse)“revolving door” cases occur when politicians enter into business.4 
These revolving door cases affect both business and politics. In the case of 
business, firms secure private gains through their political ties. They can access 
preferential lending, credits, lighter taxation, privileged treatment in government related 
contracts and less severe regulatory oversight.
5
Therefore, political connections through 
businessmen in politics or politicians in business allow firms to access more value. 
However, being a politically connected firm can be also disadvantageous. Firms with 
political ties sometimes lose their value in the stock market, undergo heavier inspection 
by the government, may perform poorer, and become technologically underdeveloped. 
                                                          
1Thomas Ferguson and Voth, “Betting on Hitler: The Value of Political Connections in Nazi Germany,” The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Febr. 2008, p. 101. 
2AyĢe Buğra and Osman SavaĢkan, Türkiye’de Yeni Kapitalizm: Siyaset, Din ve ĠĢ Dünyası, (Ġstanbul: ĠletiĢim 
Yayınları, p. 155); AyĢe Buğra, Devlet ve ĠĢ Adamları, (Ġstanbul: ĠletiĢim Yayınları,  2015), p. 71. 
3Aldo Musacchio and Ian Read, “Bankers, Industrialists and their Cliques: Elite Networks in Mexico and Brazil 
during Early Industrialization,” working paper, (2006), p. 1,13, http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/06-
048.pdf. 
4Silvia Guerra Perez, Carolina Bona Sanchez, Domingo Javier Santana Martin,  “Politically Connected Firms in 
Spain,” Business Research Quarterly, (2014), p. 5; Rodrigo Bandeira-de-Mello and Rosilene Marcon, (2011), p. 3, 
http://www.anpad.org.br/diversos/trabalhos/3Es/3es_2011/2011_3ES324.pdf; Transparency International Georgia, 
“Businessmen in Politics and Politicians in Business: Problem of Revolving Door in Georgia,”  (2013), 
http://www.transparency.ge/en/node/3659. 
5 Bandeira-de-Mello and Marcon, p. 1-2; Guerra Perez et al., p. 4; Mara Faccio, “Politically Connected Firms,” The 
American Economic Review, Vol. 96, No. 1, (Mar. 2006), p. 367 . 
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Political connections may also distort the market and the firms may became less 
efficient.
6
 Thus, connected firms can be affected by the politics negatively. 
Moreover, businessmen candidates can manipulate politics according to their 
interests. Businessmen in power may influence legislation, gather privileged 
information and influence government expenditure in favorable way to their firms. 
Apart from this, businessmen influence politics through lobbying, or through donations 
to election campaigns, which may lead to particularistic relations between the state and 
the government. Therefore, connections  between state and business may lead to 
corruption and favoritism.  In addition, political ties of the firms may even cause low 
media freedom through the connected politicians’ effect on the media companies.7 
Businessmen politicians and politician businessmen can be investigated through 
the literature of politically connected firms. One of the most relevant studies about 
politically connected firms was completed by Faccio. She looks at both the direct and 
indirect ties of companies. In her work, she investigates 47 countries, including Turkey, 
to show that the issue of politically connected firms is a world-wide phenomenon. Then, 
she compares the performance of connected and non-connected firms, arguing that 
firms gain value through the connections.
8
 Faccio’s work, as a part of finance and 
management literature, uses the same method usually adopted in available literature: 
identifying connections and then comparing performances of connected and non-
connected firms.  
This thesis, however, is an attempt to provide a descriptive analysis of the 
reciprocal relationship between business and politics by relying on the data of 
parliament between the 18
th
 and 24
th
 legislative periods of the Grand National Assembly 
of Turkey and the data of boards of directors collected from Istanbul Stock Market and 
Public Disclosure Platform regarding the period between 1998 and 2015. The research 
identifies businessmen politicians, politician businessmen and politically connected 
firms in Turkey through “the direct political connections method” of Faccio by 
                                                          
6Ishac Diwan, Philip Keefer and Marc Schiffbauer, “The Effect of Cronyism on Private Sector Growth in Egypt,” 
(Dec. 2013), working paper,  p. 1; Guerra Perez et al., p. 4; Gül Berna Özcan and Umut Gündüz, “Political 
Connectedness and Business Performance: Evidence from Turkish Industry Rankings,” Business and Politics, Vol. 
17, Issue: 1, (April 2015), p. 1. 
7 Bandeira-de-Mello and Marcon, p. 4-5,9; Scott Gehlbach, Konstantin Sonin and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 
“Businessman Candidates,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 54, No. 3, (July 2010), p.718-720;  Diwan et 
al., p. 1-2,4. 
8 Faccio, “Differences between Politically Connected and Nonconnected Firms: A Cross-Country Analysis,” 
Financial Management, (Autumn 2010), p. 907; Faccio, 2006, p. 377. 
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matching the members of boards of directors with data of parliament. Then, it looks at 
whether there are politically connected firms in Turkey. Next, politically connected 
firms according to years, sectors and parties are stated. After that, the research looks at 
the politically connected individuals more closely. Which political parties have more 
businessmen individuals  and which firms connected to which parties is explored. 
Questions like whether or not businessmen continue their career as a politician once 
they left their firms, politicians pursue a career in private companies after their term in 
the office ends, which years that both types of individuals spent in the parliament and, 
whether or not they are in the government or parliamentary committees are answered. 
Thus, the thesis is divided into three parts. The first chapter looks at available 
literature throughout the world about politically connected firms. By using the collected 
data, the second chapter identifies politically connected firms, businessmen in politics 
and politicians in business. Then, it analyzes these findings of revolving door cases. To 
identify politically connected firms and revolving door cases the direct connections 
between the firms and the politicians are used. The third chapter concludes and provides 
ideas for the further studies.  
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CHAPTER I: THE LITERATURE ON POLITICALLY CONNECTED FIRMS: 
1.1. Different Definitions of Politically Connected Firms: 
There is a recently growing body of literature about politically connected firms. 
The first and foremost issue the literature has been discussing is how to define a 
politically connected firm. Mara Faccio, in her enlightening study in which she found 
out 541 politically connected firms out of 20.202 publicly traded companies in 47 
countries from 1997-2001,
9
 explains political connections in two veins. Firstly, 
according to her, a firm is defined as politically connected if one of the top officers such 
as CEO, president, vice president, chairman or secretary sits in the national parliament 
or at least one large shareholder controlling at least 10 per cent of voting shares is a 
member of the parliament, a minister or is closely related to a top politician or party.
10
 
Here, Faccio’s definition concentrates on the direct relations between politicians and 
businessmen. Secondly, she takes indirect relationships such as friends and family into 
account. For discovering connections, she includes close relatives (sibling, parent, child 
and spouse) of ministers and heads of states. However she does not consider 
connections of family members of parliamentarians with business connections due to 
data limitations
11
. Faccio, here, does not put these data limitations explicitly.  
The close relationships between politicians and businessmen, according to 
Faccio, occur when companies whose top executives or large shareholders have been 
described as friends with the head of state, ministers or parliamentarians in the press; 
when there are connections with officials who had served as heads of state or prime 
ministers in the past; when companies whose former top executives or large 
shareholders entered politics; when a large shareholder or top executive has connections 
with foreign politicians; or when a large shareholder or a top executive is known to be 
associated with a political party.
12
 For Faccio, one-time contributions to political 
campaigns or direct payments to politicians should not be considered as close 
relationships since they do not constitute what she calls as “more durable ties”.13 
However Goldman et al. use businessmen’s donations to political campaigns as the 
                                                          
9 Although Faccio does not explicitly state the beginning year, one may assume that it is 1997, since she uses 
financial information of 1997 and data of politicians between 1997-2001. 
10 Faccio, 2006, p. 369. 
11 Faccio, 2006, p. 370; Faccio 2010, p. 907. 
12 Faccio, 2006, p. 371; Faccio, 2010, p. 907. 
13 Faccio, 2006, 369. 
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most powerful criterion to explore politically connected firms.
14
 In addition, Blau et al. 
define political connections according to lobbying expenditures.
15
 
Moreover, the political structures of different political countries play a large role 
in defining what a politically connected firm is. A politically connected firm in the 
United States, according to Goldman et al, can be defined as existing if at least one of 
the members of the board of the directors at any time in the past “held a position such as 
Senator, Member of the House of Representatives, Member of the Administration, or 
has been a Director of an organization such as the Central Intelligence Agency.”16 Here 
Goldman et al.’s emphasis of CIA is interesting since it reveals the importance and 
power of this bureaucratic institution. Bertrand et al. make a historical-sociological 
analysis and argue that a French firm as politically connected if the CEO of the 
company graduated from an elite school and had served as a civil servant. According to 
the authors, shared education and government experience backgrounds are the sources 
of business connections shared education and experience background source of 
connections.
17
 In the case of China, Fan et al. and Wu et al. include CEOs served in 
military as high ranking officers in addition to CEOs served in a local or central 
government.
18
 
1.2. Data Collection in Available Literature: 
Identifying connections seems to require laborious work on a variety of different 
sources. In order to obtain names of board of directors and shareholders, Worldscope, 
Extel, LexisNexis
19
 Thomson
20
, Reuters
21
 and Orbis
22
databases; Fortune Global 500,
23
 
                                                          
14 Goldman Eitan, Jörg Rocholl, and Jongill So, (2006), "Does political connectedness affect firm value?", University 
of North Carolina at Chapel Working Paper, p.5-6, 
http://apps.olin.wustl.edu/faculty/conferences/corpgov2006/pdf/corpGov06-092.pdf. 
15 Benjamin M. Blau, Tyler J. Brough, Diana W. Thomas, “Corporate Lobbying, Political Connectios and the Bailout 
of Banks,” Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 47, (2013), p. 3009. 
16 Goldman et al., 2006, p.8. 
17 Marianne Bertand, Francis Kramarz, Antoinette Schoar and David Thesmar, “Politically Connected CEOs 
Corporate Outcomes: Evidence from France,” (October 2014), working paper, p. 1-2. 
18 Fan, Joseph P. H., Wonga T. J. and Zhang Tianyu, "Politically connected CEOs, corporate governance, and Post-
IPO performance of China's newly partially privatized firms" ,  
Journal of Financial EconomicsVolume 84, Issue 2, May 2007, Pages 330–357; Wu, W. , Wu, C., and Rui, O.M.  
(2010), Ownership and Value of Political Connections: Evidence from China, European Financial Management, 18, 
695-729. 
19 Faccio, 2010, p. 907. 
20 Augustin de Coulon, Evagelos Pafilis, and Ġbrahim Yılmaz, “Politically Connected Banks and Employment: 
Evidence from Turkey,” (2014), working paper, p. 15, 
http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/epcs2014/openconf/modules/request.php?module=oc_program&action=view.php&id=15
2.  
21Mara Faccio, Ronald W. Masulis and John J. McConnell, Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts, The 
Journal od Finance, Vol. 51, No.6, December 2006, p. 2624. 
22Diwan et. al., 2013, p. 11. 
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Capital 500 and Forbes 500
24
 lists; and company websites are mostly utilized by 
researchers. Apart from these indicators, websites of the stock market and supervisory 
authorities are used for individual countries.
25
 The Chiefs of the State directory
26
 and 
official websites of each country’s government and parliament are the sources from 
which names of politicians are collected by the available literature.
27
 Moreover, 
business magazines and newspapers present abundant data to verify connections 
especially family and friendship ties. The authors use Forbes, The Economist and 
Fortune for well-known cases of friendships in global context. Another method in the 
literature is simply doing Google search about politicians and directors of firms.
28
 
1.3. The Effects of Political Connections on Firms and on Politics: 
In general, the literature concerning politically connected firms analyzes two 
things. The first is the effects of political connections on the firms and the second is the 
effects of politically connected firms on politics. The majority of research focuses on 
how companies are affected by political connections. The other part of the issue about 
the effects of the connections on politics has not been extensively covered in current 
literature. 
1.3.1. The Effects of Political Connections on Firms: 
Although the issue of politically connected firms is related to both the politics 
and economics disciplines, the literature is dominated by finance and management 
studies. Generally, the analysis of the effects of political connections on firms has 
concentrated on comparing the performances of connected and non-connected firms. 
Another question is whether the firms gain positive and negative value from their 
political ties. The net effect of political connections on firms is ambiguous. Political 
connections present both opportunities and risks for firms.  
1.3.1.1.The Positive Effects of Political Connections on Firms: 
It is argued that political connections may have a positive effect on a firm’s 
value including access to privileged lending, subsidies and preferential treatment 
                                                                                                                                                                          
23 Faccio, 2006, p. ; Özcan and Gündüz, p. 14. 
24 Özcan and Gündüz, p. 14. 
25Faccio et.al., 2006, p. 2630-2631. 
26Faccio, 2010, p. 906; See https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/world-leaders-1/. 
27Faccio et.al., 2006, p. 2630-2631. 
28Faccio, 2006, p. 371; Özcan and Gündüz, p. 8. 
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through increased access to bank financing. Dinç finds that lending from the 
government owned banks in emerging markets is greater than the lending from private 
banks in election years.
29
 Faccio argues that as a particular form of government support, 
politically connected firms are significantly more likely to be bailed out
30
 than their 
non-connected peers.
31
 In a study of politically connected firms in Brazil, the authors 
show that being politically connected adds value to firms. They find evidence from 
Brazilian firms showing that connected firms are able to access preferential lending. 
Also, if the firms are affiliated with business groups they can even reach more value.
32
 
Sapienza argues that in Italy, the incumbent party affects the lending behavior of state-
owned banks. Since they can borrow more, politically connected firms are able to make 
more profit.
33
 
Additionally, politically connected firms may have privileges that possibly 
increase their market power
34
 and profitability in trade protection, access to land, more 
government contract awards, relaxed enforcement of rules and regulations, lower taxes, 
fewer tax inspections, and easier licensing procurement.
35
 Besides, there usually 
happens no entrance by non-connected firms to the market and politically connected 
firms become more concentrated according to Diwan et al’s study about Egypt.36 Faccio 
argues that there is a causal link between political connections and a firm’s value. 
Political connections can provide firms with value through means such as preferential 
access to credits and government aid for financially troubled firms. Thus, as Faccio and 
Boubakri et al. state, the net effect of being politically connected exceeds the costs.
37
 
Diwan et al adds that politically connected firms under the Mubarek regime had other 
advantages compared to non-connected counterparts. There were fewer tax inspections, 
more lenient regulatory procedures and it was easier to obtain licenses for the connected 
firms. In China, politically connected firms receive preferential favor from the 
government through subsidies. Politically connected firms obtain greater subsidies than 
average. In addition, Qin argues that political connections could be a result of reputation 
                                                          
29 Dinç, I. Serdar, (2005), "Politicians and banks: political influences on government-owned banks in emerging 
markets", Journal of Financial Economics, 77, p. 453. 
30 Bail-out is a transfer payment from the government to avoid failure of the firm. (See Faccio et al., 2006) 
31 Faccio et al., 2006, p. 2597, 2627 
32 Bandeira-de-Mello and Marcon,  p. 1-3 
33 Sapienza, Paola, (2004) "The effects of Govenment Ownership on Bank Lending, Journal of Financial Economics, 
72(2), p. 357-384. 
34 Faccio, 2010, p. 906 
35 Diwan et al., p.  1. 
36 Diwan et al., p.  30. 
37 Faccio, 2010, p.906, Boubakri et. al, 2012, p. 541-559. 
 8 
 
build up both for the firms and individuals.
38
Also, former politicians sitting on the 
boards of firms have superior knowledge about executive processes and superior access 
to reach key political figures.
39
 In this context, Buğra thinks that the boards of directors 
of firms include politicians to build up networks with the government and create an 
image of the firm before the public. The general belief among businessmen is that 
having good relations with the bureaucracy is beneficial for their firms. Having political 
connections can be advantageous for firms in Turkey where there are many political and 
economic inconsistencies. Buğra also argues that Turkey’s leading business families 
such as Sabancı family gave importance to building networks with bureaucracy, 
politicians and military personnel.
40
 
Furthermore, politically connected firms can obtain higher returns on the stock 
market, lower costs of equity capital and higher profit than non-connected 
counterparts.
41
Goldman et al. demonstrate that politically connected firms to the 
winning party in the United States, make positive abnormal stock return.
42
Moreover, 
Ferguson and Voth show that parties connected with the Nazi party in 1933, had higher 
returns in Berlin Stock market.
43
 In another study about Turkey, Özcan and Gündüz 
look at connected firms on the ISO
44
 top 1000 firms list. According to this study, the 
firms with political connections have shown abnormal performance over non-connected 
firms in sales, value added and profit rate. Although they cannot perform as well as top 
the 100 firms, the fastest growing 50 firms in the list have 26 politically connected 
firms, and connected firms are less likely to drop rank in the list.
45
 In the case of 
Malaysia, there are lower costs of equity capital in connected firms as Boubakri et al. 
research shows.
46
 Over the period of 2003-2012, political connections in non-financial 
firms positively influence the valuation of the firms in the Spanish Stock Exchange over 
the period of 2003- 2012 according to Perez et al.
47
 
 
                                                          
38Qin Bei, Politicial Connection and Government Patronage: "Evidence from Chinese Manufacturing Firms", 2011, 
http://www.econ.yale.edu/conference/neudc11/papers/paper_201.pdf 
39 Guerra Perez et al., p. 1. 
40 Buğra,p.127. 
41 Faccio, 2010, p. 906 
42 Goldman et al., 2006, p.1 
43 Ferguson and Voth, p.101 
44 ISO: Istanbul Sanayi Odası:Istanbul Chamber of Industry 
45 Özcan and Gündüz, p.24-25 
46 Boubakri et. al, 2012, p. 541-559. 
47 Guerra Perez et al., p. 1 
 9 
 
1.3.1.2. The Negative Effects of Political Connections on Firms: 
One negative effect of political connections on firms is that being politically 
connected does not mean connected firms will perform better than non-connected firms. 
According to Faccio, evidence from 47 countries shows that companies with political 
connection have higher leverage
48
 and poorer accounting performance in terms of lower 
return on assets
49
 and market valuation.
50
Thus, politically connected firms are under 
more risks because they possess higher debts and fewer revenues. Boubakri et al. argue 
that politically connected newly privatized firms perform poorer in sales growth, change 
in sales and earnings growth compared toothier non-connected counterparts.
51
 
Additionally, politically connected firms suffer from asymmetric information problem 
since they have lower quality reported earnings and less accurate analyst earnings 
forecasts.
52
However, these findings may point out a selection problem; firms with 
inclination of low transparency may be looking for political connections. 
Politically connected firms can make more profits by reducing the costs. 
However there is “a trade of between the short-run benefits of enjoying low production 
prices by keeping status quo and long-run costs of postponing and blocking 
technological upgrade.”53 An opportunity cost of being connected is that time is spent 
on to creating connections rather than on technological advancements.
54
 Politically 
connected entrepreneurs are not innovative entrepreneurs; rather, they have to adapt 
themselves to the changing atmosphere of politics to survive.
55
In this context, a similar 
situation could be interpreted from the ISO top 1000 firm rankings in Turkey. There is 
only one fastest growing politically connected firm in the ISO list. Therefore, the 
politically connected firms are not able to weaken the positions of old business 
                                                          
48 Leverage ratio is total debt/total assests. It evaluates the debts of the firms. High leverage ratio is risky for firms. 
See: http://www.investinganswers.com/financial-dictionary/debt-bankruptcy/leverage-ratio-5287 
49 Return on Assets (ROA): ratio of a company’s net income prior to financing costs to total assets. See Faccio 
(2010). 
50 Ratio of market value is market to book ratio which is equity plus the book value of debt, divided by sum of book 
value of equity plus book value of debt. See: Faccio (2010) 
51Narjess Boubakri, Jean-Claude Cosset and Walid Saffar, “Political Connections of Newly Privatized Firms,” Le 
Cahiers du CEF, (January 2007), p. 30. 
52 Chen C.J.P., Li. Z., Sun Z. (2011) Rent-seeking incentives , corporate political connections and control structure of 
private firms: Chinese evidence, Journal of Corporate Finance, 17, p. 229-243; Chaney P. K, Faccio M. , Parsley, D. 
(2011), "The quality of accounting information in politically connected firms" Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
51,  p. 58-76. 
53 Giorgio Belletini, Carlotta Berti Ceroni and Giovanni Prarolo, “Knowing the Right Person in the Right Place: 
Political Connections and Resistance to Change,”  working paper, (January 2012), p. 24  
54 ibid, p. 3 
55 Buğra, p. ; Buğra and SavaĢkan, p. 299. 
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groups,
56
 which already have incorporated technological developments into their 
operations. 
Apart from these factors, being politically connected could be burdensome for 
firms because of three reasons. Firstly, there could be reciprocity in being connected. In 
the French case of politically connected CEOs, Bertrand et al. find that economic favors 
such as subsidies are reciprocated by firms through creating more jobs especially in 
election years although it leads to lower profitability rates for the firms.
57
 Shleifer and 
Vishny observe that politicians extract rents from connected firms and expropriate part 
of the shareholder’s wealth.58 Also Qian et al. believe that expropriation activities of 
controlling owners through self-dealing and tunneling are more likely to be seen in 
politically connected firms because connected firms can secure bank financing and 
evade capital market punishment.
59
 Secondly, political connections can be detrimental 
in terms of the qualifications of managers and directors who are appointed to politically 
connected firms. Because of the fact that these individuals have a political rather than 
professional background, their incentives are more likely guided by political 
considerations.
60
 
In addition, being politically connected makes firms vulnerable to political 
events
61
 and shocks. Fisman argues that there was a downturn in Indonesian economy in 
1995-1997, during the Asian crisis, which caused speculations about the reasons behind 
it. According to Fisman, political connections were a driving force for investments and 
determinants of profits in Indonesia. Fisman identified times when there were rumors 
about the President Suharto’s health and compared returns of firms. The findings show 
that returns on the shares of politically dependent firms were considerably lower than 
the returns of less dependent firms. Thus, well connected firms suffered more than less 
connected firms in reaction to rumors. Politically dependent firms lost more value 
                                                          
56 Old business groups mentioned  in Buğra 2015: Akkök Holding, Koç Holding, Sabancı Holding, EczacıbaĢı 
Holding,  
57 Bertrand et al., p. 1 
58 Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, “Politicians and Firms,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109, 
No. 4, (November 1994), p.995, 1019. 
59 Qian et al., 2011 
60Narjess Boubakri, Omrane Guedhami, Dev Mishra and Walid Saffar, “Political Connections and the Cost of Equity 
Capital,” Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 18, (2012), p. 544. 
61 Politically connected firms can be even affected from election results: Katmerciler Holding, producer of TOMA 
(Toplumsal Olaylara Müdahale Aracı: Intervention Vehicle to Social Events) ,which have board of the directors and 
owners are deputies in 24th period of AKP, lost their value in Stock Market Ġstanbul the day after June 7 2015 
elections. According to election results there will be  a coalition government in Turkey, after 13 years of majoritarian 
government AKP. See: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/29229123.asp. 
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during the episodes about rumors of Suharto’s health.62Therefore, companies linked to 
Suharto and his family received value from these connections. However, the death of 
Suharto caused firms to lose their value in the stock market. In this context, Faccio and 
Parsley argue that there is significant decrease in firm value at the times of deaths of 
politicians.
63
 
In a recent study, Özcan and Gündüz argue that connected firms face the threats 
of losing their benefits when key agents leave their positions as it happened in Turkey. 
The breaking down of the alliance between AKP and Fethullah Gülen on 17 December 
2013 negatively influenced the previously favored firms of AKP. For instance, Bank 
Asya faced liquidity problems and large companies like Turkish Airlines withdrew their 
deposits. Zaman newspapers were removed from Turkish Airline in-flight services, and 
also dropped from government linked advertisements and promotions. Also, 
TUSKON
64
affiliated firms were faced with tax evasion investigations.
65
 Thus, being 
politically connected can be hazardous sometimes and “previously favored firms can 
fall from grace and lose their fortune entirely” as Özcan and Gündüz argue.66 
1.3.2 The Effects of Politically Connected Firms on Politics 
There are relatively fewer studies about the political side of politically connected 
firms. One of the ways politically connected firms can affect politics is through the 
donations to electoral campaigns. These may affect election results. Hacker and 
Aberbach argue that in the United States, large corporations and small businessmen 
make substantial contributions on the national and local levels, respectively to election 
campaign funds. Although money alone is not enough to elect anyone to office, it is an 
important means of bringing a candidate’s name and personality before the public.67 
Moreover, Gehlbach et al. state that businessmen can influence policy by 
lobbying the election winner for favorable treatments and running for elections. 
Businessmen in power may be able to influence legislation, gather privileged 
                                                          
62 Raymond Fisman, “Estimating the Value of Political Connections, The American Economic Review, Vol. 91, No. 
4, (September 2001), p.  1095-1102. 
63 Faccio Mara and Parsley David, "Sudden Deaths: Taking Stock of Geographic Ties, Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis" Volume 44,Issue 03,June 2009, pp 683-718. 
64a pro Islamist business association close to Fethullah Gülen 
65 It is very interesting that according to Özcan and Gündüz TUSKON closed its website “to block information and to 
remove sensetive data”. The website is still closed on July, 2015. “Try to see”: tuskontrade.com.tr 
66 Özcan and Gündüz, p. 22,26 
67 Andrew Hacker and Joel D. Aberbach, “Businessman in Politics,” Law and Contemporary Problems, (Spring 
1962), p. 276. 
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information, and even influence government expenditures.
68
 Businessman politicians 
would have agenda setting power in the parliament. Client-business networks and lobby 
groups lead to selective and pro-business agendas in law making procedures. For 
example, in Turkey the parliament was affected from business incentives of jewelers 
and diamond sector were exempted from tax. According to allegations, the related law 
was passed thanks to the close relations between jeweler Cihan Kamer and the prime 
minister.
69
 Here, on the one hand politics is influenced by business and on the other 
hand, the politics of law-making is influenced by business connections. 
Another discussion is about the transfer of benefits from politically connected 
firms to politicians through employment creation. Coulon et al. in their research suggest 
that politically connected banks in Turkey have 10% higher employment growth rates 
compared to their non-connected counterparts, especially in parliamentary election 
years.
70
 Moreover, Bertrand et al. show that politically connected CEOs hire more 
employees during the election cycle. Interestingly, especially left wing connected CEOs 
are more likely to answer to the needs of left-wing political incumbents in France.
71
 
Politically connected firms in the media sector appear to be influential in 
politics. If politicians own the media, they can exercise power to manipulate the 
news.
72
According to Buğra, in the media sector, the owners do favors for politicians 
rather than the politicians doing favors for the owners. Therefore, politicians can build 
or reinforce their positive image in front of the public through using politically 
connected media.
73
 
1.4.The relationship between business-politics connections and country indicators: 
One of the things that the current literature fails to create a monolithic body of 
ideas is about the direction of causality between politics and business. Whether the 
politically connected firms constitute dependent or independent variables cannot be 
easily discovered. Therefore, the existing literature predominantly emphasizes 
correlations instead of the direction of causality.  
                                                          
68 Gehlbach et al., 2010, p.3.   
69 Buğra, p. 147 
70Coulon et. al, p.15 
71 Bertrand et al., p. 1 
72 Djankov, Simeon, Caralee McLiesh, Tatiana Nenova, and Andrei Shleifer. 2003. "Who owns the media?", Journal 
of Law and Economics 46(2): 341-381. 
73 Buğra, p. 161. 
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Faccio argues that there is a correlation between corruption and connections. 
According to her, high corruption level is positively correlated with politically 
connected firms. In both developed and developing countries, the value of the firm 
increases when an entrepreneur is elected as a top political position especially in highly 
corrupted countries. To obtain significant benefits, businessmen need personally 
involved in to the politics to “squeeze the state.” To put it in the opposite way, it might 
be that corruption emerges as a result of political connections since companies without 
political connections need to bribe politicians to obtain minimum benefits for survival 
of their firms.
74
 Guerra Perez et al., in their study about Spain, put this relation very 
clearly. Spain is one of the largest countries in Europe with highest levels of corruption 
in Corruption Perceptions Index of Transparency International. The authors argue that 
between 2003 and 2012 around half of the non-financial firms in the stock market Spain 
are politically connected. This indicates a correlation between the number of connected 
firms and high level of corruption according to Guerra Perez et al.
75
 
Another correlation is between connections and institutions. Business-politics 
connections may stem from institutional environments of countries or political 
connections may lead to institutional arrangements. According to Gehlbach et al. in 
weak institutional structures, businessmen are less likely to keep their promises. In fact, 
businessmen usually run for public office when commitment mechanisms such as 
political parties enable candidates to make weak campaign promises. In addition, if a 
country’s property rights and institutions are weak and if there is clientelism and 
patronage, political connections are established to overcome these institutional 
deficiencies.
76
 With uneven distribution of property rights
77
, new sources of patronage 
may be leading to long-lasting electoral success and possibility of the emergence of 
authoritarian tendencies. Thus, deepening business and politics ties could be negative 
for the firms as well as for the political institutions.
78
 
In countries with low freedom of press levels, politics-business connections are 
more likely to be seen. Gehlbach et al. state that in Russian gubernatorial elections, 
                                                          
74 Faccio, 2006, p. 380 
75Guerra Perez et al., 2014, p. 1  
76 Gehlbach et al., .p 5 
77According to “Family Companies Report” by Adrian Wooldridge in the Economist in 2015, political connections 
between the politicians and businessmen is very common in Latin American countries as a result of weak property 
rights. For example inBrazil  JBS meat company, which expanded with the credits from a national development bank, 
was the bigger donor in Brazilian elections in 2014. See: The Economist, April18th-24th 2015 p. 3-16 
78 Özcan and Gündüz, p. 27  
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businessmen candidates are more likely to be seen in areas with low media freedom, 
low government transparency and weak institutions.
79
Also, Boukbari et al. argue that 
politically connected firms enjoy lower costs of equity capital in countries with less 
democratic systems and less press freedom.
80
 
In addition, there is a correlation between business-politics connections and 
economic growth. In his analysis of political connections in Poland, Hasan et al. argue 
that significance of political connections is some degree conditional on the 
macroeconomic situation. According to the authors, political instability in Poland 
reinforces the impact of political connections on access to long term financing. During 
the economic crisis in 2007, political connections have shown more powerful impact on 
to access long term funds in Poland.
81
 Moreover, political connections of the firms as 
micro events can also leads to macro results. In Egypt, connections as a micro events 
cause macroeconomic results mainly because of the fact that politically connected firms 
decrease firm entry and cause less competitive economy. Thus, economic growth is 
reduced due to stagnation by group of firms with higher concentration in the market. As 
a result, political connections cause crony capitalism and sectors with few, large, and 
moderately performed firms.
82
 In addition, networking is a time consuming activity 
which leads managers of the firm spend time on connections rather than innovation. 
These technologically backward firms lead the countries to end up with low income 
trap.
83
  
Apart from that, politically connected firms may also produce positive effects of 
on the level of economic development on countries. According to Buğra close relations 
between state and firms contributed to county’s economy in Asian countries. For 
example in South Korea the close relationship between state and family owned firms 
called as "chaebol" were substantial for country’s economic development84.  
 
 
                                                          
79Gehlbach et al., .p 1 
80 Boukbari et al., 2012, p. 555 
81 Iffekhar Hasan, Krzysztof Jackowicz, Oskar Kowalewski and Lukasz Kozlowski,  “Politically Connected Firms in 
Poland and their Access to Bank Financing,” BOFIT Discussion Paper, No. 2, (2014), p. 22. 
82Diwan et al., p.  1. 
83Belletini et al., 2012, p. 24 
84 Buğra and Osman, p. 171-172. 
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1.5. The Literature on Political Elites and Their career backgrounds 
Revolving door cases and Politically connected firms can also extracted from 
career paths of the politicians through studying their biographies. According to  Sayarı 
and Dikici Bilgin, there are social pathways to cabinet in Turkey. Therefore are 
occupational is an important factor to be recruited in the executive body of the 
government. In Turkey mostly seen occupations of the executive body are legal 
professions, civil servants and business professionals.
85
  In another study, ÖniĢ 
examines biography and career background of Turgut Özal, 8th President of Turkey, in 
a detailed manner to understand neo-liberalism in Turkey. ÖniĢ presents that Turgut 
Özal worked at both private sector and bureaucracy, at State Planning Institute, before 
being president
86
. Therefore,  Özal was one of the example of revolving door cases and 
his career background affected Turkish legislative and executive bodies. Moreover, 
Power and Mochel argue that the careers of the deputies before the parliament is 
significant for the level of institutionalization  and legislative activities of the 
parliament. Some of the findings from their analysis of deputies in Brazil reveals that, 
right-wing candidate have higher income levels before entering into the parliament; and 
the majority of the candidates winning the elections are firm owners and senior 
bureaucrats and media owners
87
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
85 Sabri Sayarı, Sabri and  Hasret Dikici Bigin,, "Paths to Power: The Making of Cabinet Ministers in Turkey, 
Parliamentary Affairs, 2011, p. 1-26. 
86 Ziya ÖniĢ, "Turgut Özal and His Economic Legacy:  Turkish Neo-Liberalism in a Critical Perspective, Middle 
Eastern Studies" Volume 40, Issue 4, 2004, p. 113. 
 
87 Timothy J. Power and Marilia Mochel, "Shaping the Brazilian Political Class:  Cause and Consequence of 
Recruitment to the Chamber of Deputies, 2006,  p.3-7 
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CHAPTER II:  
2.1. Definition of Politically Connected Firms in Turkey  
Among the several definitions of politically connected firms, this research uses 
the one with direct connections between the board members of the firms and the 
members of the parliament because there is publically available data.  In this study a 
firm is a politically connected firm if it satisfies at least one of the conditions below: 
1. If at least one of the board members of the company is a parliamentarian;  
2. If one of the board members of the company was a former parliamentarian; 
3. When a company’s former member of the board of the directors entered into 
the parliament. 
Therefore, a firm is politically connected if one of the company’s members of 
board of the directors is a member of the parliament at a point in time. 
2.2. Setting the Political Scene: 1987-2015  
The analysis will start from late 1980s since when Turkish economy became an 
open market economy. Buğra states that Turkey’s institutional structure was not ready 
for economic liberalization reforms at that time. Neoliberalism and institutionalism did 
not go hand in hand. Instead of primary institutional transformations, the government 
became much more centralized through increasing the power of executive body and 
especially increasing the power of prime minister. Although it undermines checks and 
balances, Governmental Decrees were used rather than Acts of the Parliament in 
decision making processes including economic decisions. Turkish economy became 
open to government interventions and inclined to instabilities and corruption as ÖniĢ 
states. 
88
 In accordance with this, the success of the businessmen became tied to their 
relations with the government 1980s and 1990s witnessed many corruption scandals 
involving the government party ANAP and other parties DYP, SHP and RP.
89
 
 
 
                                                          
88ÖniĢ, Ziya “Turgut Özal and His Economic Legacy: Turkish Neoliberalism in Critical Perspective”, Middle Eastern 
Studies, 40 (4), 2007, p. 113-134. 
89 Buğra and SavaĢkan, 2015, p. 89-90. 
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2.3. Data Collection: 
 Generally, in politically connected firms literature, several databases are used 
such as Worldscope, Extel, LexisNexis
90
 and Thomson Reuters.
91
 They are useful 
sources of information about the firms all around the world. However, these databases 
are usually expensive. Also there is risk for these databases cannot include all 
information about the firms accurately for each and every country. Faccio, in her 
research on politically connected firms in 47 countries, makes an analysis of 78 firms in 
Turkey by using these databases. Among these 78 firms with available financial data, 
she just finds 1 firm with political connections.
92
 Having just 1 connected firm seems 
questionable for the Turkish case
93
 because of the fact that the literature argues that 
politically connected firms are more likely to be seen in countries with high corruption 
rate and low media freedom levels.
94
 
To put it more clearly, according to Transparency International Corruption 
Perceptions Index in 2014 Turkey is 64
th
 in 175 countries. The index uses a scale where 
100 stands for the most clean and 0 for the most corrupt. Turkey’s result getting worse, 
losing 5 points to 45 than 2013.
95
 Moreover, according to Reporters Without Borders 
World Press Freedom Index in 2015, Turkey has ranked 149 out of 180 countries
 .96
  
Relying on this data, one can argue that Turkey is a country with high levels of 
corruption and low levels of media freedom. Therefore, it must have more politically 
connected firms than what Faccio puts forth. In fact, there are also many anecdotal 
evidences about political connections of Turkish firms in newspapers circulated 
nationwide.
97
 Therefore, Faccio’s findings about Turkey are subject to criticism. There 
are possibly more connections that she failed to include.  
                                                          
90 Faccio, 2010, p. 907. 
91Coulon et al., 2014, p. 14. 
92 Faccio, 2006, p. ,375; Faccio, 2010, p. 908. 
93 Faccio, 2010, p. 908. 
94 Faccio, 2006, p. 380. 
95Corruption Perceptions Index 2014: http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results; 
http://www.todayszaman.com/anasayfa_turkey-biggest-loser-in-global-corruption-ranking-survey-
shows_366038.html; http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/03/us-corruption-transparency-report-
idUSKCN0JH09520141203; http://www.newsweek.com/g20-leader-turkey-sees-biggest-hike-corruption-288883. 
96 Press Freedom Index by Reportes without Borders: https://index.rsf.org/#!/; 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-climbs-in-global-press-freedom-index-but-warned-about-poor-
record.aspx?pageID=238&nID=78265&NewsCatID=339. 
97 See some newspaper articles: Turkcellle bağlan AKP’ye: http://www.taraf.com.tr/ekonomi/turkcellle-baglan-
akpye/; Turkcell AKP’nin Kapsama Alanında: http://www.zaman.com.tr/ekonomi_turkcell-akpnin-kapsama-
alaninda_2274722.html; Hısım Akraba THY ile Uçuşa Geçmiş: http://www.zaman.com.tr/ekonomi_hisim-akraba-thy-
ile-ucusa-gecmis_2263265.html; Abdullah Gül’ün oğlu 1 günde 10 Şirket kurdu: 
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Thus, in this thesis, a new database has been created with the names of the board 
of the directors and the names of the parliamentarians utilizing the publicly available 
data which, according to Faccio, is better to investigate since the connections found by 
this data could be stronger.
98
 To build a new database, two data sets have been used to 
detect the politically connected firms in Turkey. The first data set have been grasped 
from the website of Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA), which is 
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr. The information about18
th
 to 24
th
 Legislative Terms, which 
includes the period between1987 and 2015, is used. There are 450 deputies in each of 
18
th
 and 19
th
 legislative terms and 550 deputies for the each of 20
th
 to 24
th
 terms. The 
Album of Deputies presents valuable information about the names of deputies according 
to election districts, their photos, and short biographies of the deputies including date of 
the birth, name of parents, number of children, occupation, and working experience. 
The website also presents legislative activities of the deputies meaning that law 
proposals and questions put by deputies in the assembly could be seen.  
The second data set exploited for building a new database is the list of the board 
of directors and general managers of the firms collected annually. These lists are 
provided by two different institutions; Stock Market Istanbul and Public Disclosure 
Platform (PDP). This data has been chosen because the firms that are traded on Stock 
Market Istanbul are required to disclose their information to these institutions according 
to Turkish laws.
99
 This may make any piece of information significantly accountable 
and valuable. For the period between 1998 and 2008, "Yearbooks of Companies”100 
prepared by Stock Market Istanbul were used. These yearbooks include full name of the 
firm, its establishment date, main business line, address of head office, the name of 
general manager, the names of board of the directors, telephone and fax numbers of the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
http://www.aydinlikgazete.com/turkiye/abdullah-gulun-oglu-1-gunde-10-sirket-kurdu-h62511.html; Yumurtalar elde 
kaldı: http://www.gazetevatan.com/yumurtalar-elde-kaldi-kemal-bey-devreye-girdi-786704-ekonomi/; CHP Başkanı 
İş Bankası Atamaları’nı Savundu; 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/ekonomi/chp_baskani_kilicdaroglu_is_bankasina_atamalari_savundu_abdde_egitildiler-
1184605; Bacanağa DYP Takibi: http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/09/24/t/siyasetframe.html; Cindoruk’u İsyan 
Ettiren Atamalar: http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/08/29/t/siyaset/cin.html; Muhalefet isyan etti: O vekile 5 yılda 78 
ihale http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/29684373.asp; VIP Arpalık, AKP Ballı MaaĢlı ġirketlerde Böyle 
kadrolaĢtı: http://www.zaman.com.tr/ekonomi_vip-arpalik-akp-balli-maasli-sirketlerde-boyle-
kadrolasti_2274238.html. 
98Faccio, 2006, p. 369. 
99Sermaye Piyasası Kurumu (Capital Markets Board of Turkey), Özel Durumlar Tebliği, No: 288891, 
http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2014/01/20140123-5.htm?submenuheader=null; 
http://www.spk.gov.tr/indexcont.aspx?action=showpage&menuid=12&pid=0&subid=5;http://kap.gov.tr/yay/Mevzua
t/Brosur.pdf. 
100 ġirket Yıllıkları in Turkish. Before 1998 no data was kept by the stock market. The list of the board of the 
directors can be find from“IMKB Gunluk Bülten” 
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firm, number of employees, collective bargaining period, employer’s union, authorized 
capital, issued capital, trading market, production information for last 2 years, capacity 
utilization rate, export and import information for last 2 years, continuing investments, 
participations and lastly the shareholders. For the period after 2008, however, PDP’s 
website has been published, because from then on it will be PDP’s responsibility to 
collect information about the firms in the stock market and share them with the public. 
The website www.kap.gov.tr, which has been updated regularly, gives detailed 
information about the firms including their financial charts. Therefore, the list of the 
board of the directors between 2009 and 2015 comes from PDP’s website. 
The yearbooks from Stock Market Istanbul just provide the names of board 
members. Unlike yearbooks, PDP gives more detailed information about board 
members; such as gender, title, profession, positions held in the company in the last 5 
years, current position held outside the company, shareholding ratio, the share group 
that the board member representing, independent board member or not and, committees 
charged and task. However, it seems like giving detailed information about board 
members is not compulsory. Unfortunately, the information about boards of the 
directors is not complete for all of the firms. Some firms just have the names of the 
board of the directors. Some of them have much more detailed information about the 
profession and current positions held outside company. According to Turkish 
Commercial Code, the firms in the stock market must have 5 members in their board of 
directors. However there are firms with less number of people as well as there are many 
firms with more than 5 members in their board.
101
 
After generating these datasets of the board members and the deputies, I 
matched the names and created another list with direct relations of deputies and 
directors. As the following step, I compared each year’s list of deputies with each year’s 
list of the board of the directors. Identifying connections requires laborious work and 
keen eyes. In fact, the most important problem while doing my research was to come up 
with a lot of people with the same name. I, first of all, checked PDP website. 
Nevertheless, for many individuals the information provided in the website is not 
enough to detect whether they are same person or not. As the other resort, I tried to go 
deep into the biographies of the deputies from TGNA website and Album of Deputies.  
If still I cannot differentiate the people, I made Google search about the connected 
                                                          
101Anonim ġirket Yönetim Kurulu Üye Sayısı, http://www.ticaretkanunu.net/makale-21/ 
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person and the firm. Websites of the parties, firms, the activity reports of the companies, 
personal web pages of the deputies, newspaper articles related to weddings and funerals, 
news from local newspapers and Linkedin constitute really valuable sources of 
information about the connected individuals and the companies. After checking 
numerous resources, I matched individuals in the board of directors of the firms and the 
lists of the deputies as accurately as I could and I named these firms as politically 
connected firms; and persons as politically connected individuals.    
 
2.4. Introducing the Data: 
According to the data from yearbooks and PDP website, from 1998 to 2015, 
there have been 694 different companies in total that traded in the Stock Market 
Istanbul. The number of the firms in Stock Market Istanbul changes from year to year 
since some firms leave the stock market whereas others enter. Therefore, there is no 
available information for all firms each year. Besides, in my interview with a person 
from PDP, I have learnt that the year 2009 could have incomplete data since it is the 
time when companies had to provide their data to PDP instead of Stock Market Ġstanbul. 
For this year, some firms failed to notify PDP. My interviewee also told that there is 
actually Disclaimer Notice about the data belonging to the period before June, 1
st
 
2009.
102
 There are also some other firms which have not yet provided their data for 
2015. Therefore some information for the years 2009 and 2015 is missing.
103
 
 
Table 1: The number of Firms with available data in Stock Market İstanbul from 
1998-2015 
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280 300 309 304 301 300 309 322 327 374 369 161 214 259 397 352 451 308 
 
Thus, the number of firms with available information of the board of the 
directors is the lowest with 161 in 2009 which is parallel to what the person from PDP 
has told to me. Also there are 308 firms in 2015, which is lower than the last two years. 
                                                          
102The Copyright and Disclaimer Notice is available on: https://www.kap.gov.tr/telif-hakki-ve-cekince-ihbari-
bildirimi.aspx. 
103I made a telephone interview on 12.07.2015.  
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As for sectorial breakdown displayed in Table 1, one should rely on information 
provided by PDP about 436 companies. The most number of firms in manufacturing 
industry, financial institutions and wholesale and retail trade industries. They consists 
93% to 85 % of the stock market in 2000 to 2015.  
Table 2: Sectorial Breakdown of Stock Exchange Istanbul Companies* 
                  Year 
Sector 
2000 2005 2010 2015 
Manufacturing 
Industry 
58.4% 56.6% 49.2 % 44.03% 
Financial 
Institutions 
28.3% 28.3% 33.5% 33% 
Wholesale and 
Retail Trade, 
Hotels and 
Restaurants 
6.7% 5.9 % 5.7% 8.5% 
Electricity, Gas, 
Water 
2.2% 1.3% 1.5% 1.6% 
Technology 2.2% 3.3% 3.9% 3.7% 
Transportation, 
Communication 
and Storage 
1.3% 1.6% 2.4% 2.3% 
Education 
Health Sports 
and Other 
Services 
0.6% 2% 1.8% 1.3% 
Construction 
and Public 
Works 
0.3% 0.7% 1.2% 2.3% 
Mining 0% 0.3% 0.6% 1.3% 
Real Estate 
Activities 
NA NA NA 0.22 % 
 
*2000,2005,2010 data is from Istanbul Stock Exchange by Figures
104
, 2015 data is my calculation from 
PDP website. 
 
 
                                                          
104"Verilerle IMKB" 
http://www.borsaistanbul.com/data/kilavuzlar/Verilerle%20%C4%B0MKB%20ISE%20by%20Figures.pdf. 
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Table 3: Sectorial Breakdown of Stock Exchange Istanbul Companies from 1998 to 
2015 
Sectors 
No.of 
firms 
Percentages 
Manufacturing 
Industry 
278 40.05% 
Financial 
Institutions 
261 37.6% 
Wholesale and 
Retail Trade, 
Hotels and 
Restaurants 
59 8.5% 
Electricity, Gas, 
Water 
       16 2.3% 
Technology 16 2.3% 
Transportation, 
Communication 
and Storage 
14 2,01% 
Education 
Health Sports 
and Other 
Services 
10 1.44% 
Construction 
and Public 
Works 
16 2.3% 
Mining 7 1% 
Real Estate 
Activities 
1 0.14% 
Others (incl. 
funds) 
16 2.3% 
TOTAL 694 100% 
 
There are 694 different firms in different markets of stock market which are 
traded in different markets of stock market Istanbul between 1998-2015. These firms 
are traded in different markets of Stock Market Ġstanbul. The most number of firms in 
manufacturing industry, financial institutions and wholesale and retail trade industries. 
They consists 85 % of the stock market. 
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CHAPTER III: DATA 
3.1. Analysis of Politically Connected Firms: 
 According to the findings, the number of politically connected firms is 125. As a 
result, 18% of the total firms with available data are politically connected. The number 
of firms with available information and the number of politically connected firms 
changes year to year. Even though political connections exist in each year. Total 
number of politically connected firms in the Stock Market is slightly increasing from 
1998 to 2015.  
Table 4: Politically Connected Firms across 1998-2015 
Years 
 No.of 
the 
firms 
with 
available 
data  
No.of 
Politically 
Connected 
firms  
Percentages 
1998 280 21 
7,5 % 
1999 300 16 
5,3 % 
2000 309 16 
5,18 % 
2001 304 15 
4,93 % 
2002 301 18 
5,98 % 
2003 300 21 
7 % 
2004 309 25 
8,09 % 
2005 322 30 
9,32 % 
2006 327 37 
11,31 % 
2007 374 38 
10,16 % 
2008 369 30 
8,13 % 
2009 161 20 
12,42 % 
2010 214 31 
14,49 % 
2011 259 33 
12,74 % 
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2012 397 51 
12,85 % 
2013 352 38 
10,8 % 
2014 451 48 
10,65 % 
2015 308 21 
6,81 % 
 
Figure 1: Politically Connected Firms across 1998-2015 
 
Although the number of connected firms increased from 1999 to 2007, it 
decreased in 2008, 2009 and 2015. Moreover, percentages of the connected firms to the 
number of available firms changes between 4,93 % to 14,49. Because of the fact that 
number of politically connected firm is declined in 2009, as a result, there are possibly 
other politically connected firms do not appear on this list
105
. 
There are politically connected firms in holding type of organizations. In this 
case, connected individuals are connected to multiple firms which are tied to a main 
holding. Some examples from connected firms: Akbank is Sabancı family firm; 
Yapıkredi Bankası is owned by Koç family; Pınarsu is owned by YaĢar Holding; 
Hürriyet Gazetesi owned by Doğan Holding; Ülker owned by Yıldız Holding; Coca 
Cola owned by Anadolu Group; Ak-Al Tekstil owned by Akkök Group. There are also 
                                                          
105 I also asked about what is the laws for the firms about their notifications of the board of the directors. The person 
told me that they do not push the firms to fill out the forms in PDP, firms do not have to update their information in a 
yearly basis. However, there is tebliğ by SPK and firms know that they have to update their information regularly. 
For large  firms it does not create problems but for smaller firms, they sometimes do not update information about the 
firm. She also said that it is firms’ responsibility to fill out the basic information about them.  They do not try to get 
information from the firms.  
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state owned and privatized companies among politically connected firms such as Türk 
Hava Yolları, Ziraat Bankası, Vakıfbank and Türk Telekom. Another interesting case is 
ĠĢ Bankası. Although the firm is owned by CHP it is connected to multiple parties.  
As for the analysis of the politically connected sectors, the most number of 
politically connected firms are in financial institutions sector with 59 firms. Among the 
firms in financial institutions 20 firms are holdings and investment companies, 18 firms 
are banks and financial corporations, 7 firms are real estate investment trusts, 5 firms 
are financial leasing and factoring companies, 3 firms are insurance companies, 3 firms 
are investment trusts, 2 firms are brokerage houses and 1 firm is in other financial 
institutions sector. 
The sector with most number of firms in the Stock Market is manufacturing 
industry however in the case of politically connected firms; there are more political 
connections in financial institutions rather than manufacturing industry. There are fewer 
number of firms in financial sector but more number of connected firms compared to 
manufacturing industry. In manufacturing industry there 45 politically connected firms. 
Among them, 10 firms are in non-metallic mineral products; 9 firms in fabricated metal 
products; 9 firms in food, beverage and tobacco sector; 4 firms are in textile, wearing 
apparel and leather sector; 4 firms in paper and paper products, printing and publishing 
sector; 4 firms in chemical, petroleum, rubber and plastic products; 4 firms are in basic 
metal industries; and 1 firm is in wood products including furniture sector.  
Table 5: Politically connected firms across the sectors 
Sector 
No. of 
Connected 
Firms 
Percentage 
Financial Institutions 59 
47.2% 
Manufacturing 
Industry 
45 
36% 
Wholesale and Retail 
Trade, Hotels and 
Restaurants 
7 
5,6% 
Transportation, 
Communication and 
Storage 
5 
4 % 
Mining 3 
2.4% 
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The other politically connected industry is wholesale, retail trade, hotels and 
restaurants sector with 7 firms. In this sector; 4 firms in consumer trade; 2 firms in 
restaurants and hotels sector; and 1 firm is in wholesale trade sector. There are also 5 
politically connected firms are in transportation, communication and storage sector. 2 
politically connected firms are in communications and 3 firms are in transportation 
sectors. In addition, there are 3 politically connected companies in mining sector, 2 
companies in electricity and gas sector, 2 companies in mining sector, 1 company in 
education and health sector, 1 company technology sector, 1 company in construction 
and public works, and 1 company in real estate activities sector. 
Both in the US
106
 and Egypt, politically connected firms are more common in 
manufacturing sector. In Egypt, these firms are in energy and capital intensive 
industries such as metals, cement, plastics, textiles or ceramics.
107
Agrawal and Knoeber 
argue that manufacturing sectors are more likely to be affected by politics through 
government purchases, trade policy and environmental regulations.
108
 The tendency is 
similar in Turkey; manufacturing sector is one of the sectors with the most number of 
connections. In this sector there are 8 cement producers out of 21 factories are 
                                                          
106Anup Agrawal and Charles R. Knoeber, 2001, Do Some Outside Directors Play a Political Role?, Journal 
of Law and Economics, Vol.44 p. 180 
107Diwan et al., p. 16 
108Anup Agrawal and Charles R. Knoeber, 2001, Do Some Outside Directors Play a Political Role?, Journal 
of Law and Economics, Vol.44 p. 180 
Electricity, Gas, Water 2 
1.6% 
Technology 1 
0.8% 
Education Health 
Sports and Other 
Services 
1 
0.8% 
Construction and 
Public Works 
1 
0.8% 
Real Estate Activities 1 
0.8% 
TOTAL 125 
100 % 
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politically connected. There are also ceramic factories such as Kütahya Porselen as 
politically connected.  
Among politically connected firms, 95 have connections to only one party and 
30 are connected to multiple parties. Among the firms connected to one party, there are 
42 firms connected with ANAP, 28 firms connected to AKP, 5 firms connected to CHP, 
5 firms connected to DYP, 3 firms connected to FP, 1 firm connected to MHP, and 1 
firm is connected to DSP. There are also 9 firms connected to non-party/independent 
individuals. 
Table 6: Politically Connected Firms to One Party: 
Connected to One Party No. Of Connected 
Firms 
ANAP 43 
AKP 27 
Independent 9 
CHP 5 
DYP 5 
FP 3 
MHP 1 
DSP 1 
YTP 1 
SHP 0 
RP 0 
                 YDH 0 
Total 95 
 
As Table 6 displays, ANAP appears as the most connected party with the firms 
in the stock market. The second party is AKP. Among the firms are connected to 
multiple parties, there are 26 out of 30 are connected with a right wing party. Another 
similarity between ANAP and AKP is that they both established majority governments. 
Unlike ANAP and AKP, DYP and RP as right wing parties experienced coalition 
governments. It could be a result of why there are more ANAP and AKP connections 
rather than other parties.  
The same tendency is observable also in Table 7 which shows the data of 
politically connected firms to multiple parties. There are 25 firms which have 
 28 
 
connections with either ANAP or AKP; whereas there are only 5 firms connected to 
other parties and independent parliamentarians.   
Table 7: Politically Connected Firms to Multiple Parties 
Connected to Multiple 
Parties 
No. Of 
Connected 
Firms 
ANAP+AKP 5 
ANAP+CHP 1 
ANAP+Independent 3 
ANAP+Independent+AKP 1 
ANAP+CHP+SHP 1 
ANAP+CHP+AKP 1 
AKP+MHP 1 
AKP+YTP 3 
AKP+FP+RP 4 
AKP+FP+RP+YTP 3 
AKP+CHP+Independent 1 
AKP+CHP+DSP+MHP 1 
Independent+DYP 2 
FP+RP 1 
YTP+DSP 1 
DYP+YDH 1 
Total 30 
 
Another interesting result from Table 6 is that YDH and YTP appear as parties 
that firms have political connections. Among these parties, YDH was established by 
businessmen Cem Boyner who is a board member of Altınyıldız  Holding. Although, he 
was not get elected in the elections and cannot become parliamentarian, there connected 
individuals from these parties.
109
 
Table 8: Connected Firms Party and Sectors, connections for one party 
    Sector    
Party 
Man Fin Whole Elect. Tech Trans Edu Cons Min Real 
         
          
          
          
          
          
          
ANAP 15 20 3 1 - 2 - 1 1 - 
AKP 11 13 1 - - 2 - - - - 
                                                          
109"Türkiye Siyasetinde Tutunamayanlar", http://www.yazangenclik.com/turkiye-siyasetinde-tutunamayanlar-
5986;"Büyük Sermaye'den buraya kadar" http://haber.sol.org.tr/ekonomi/buyuk-sermayeden-buraya-kadar-haberi-
21836 
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CHP 1 4 - - - - - - - - 
DYP 4 - - - - - - - - 1 
FP 3 - - - - - - - - - 
MHP - - - - 1 - - - - - 
DSP - - 1 - - - - - - - 
YTP - 1 - - - - - - - - 
Indep. 6 2 1 - - - - - - - 
 
 
Table 9: Connected Firms Party and Sectors, connections with multiple parties 
 Man Fin Whole Elect Tech Trans Edu Cons Min Real 
ANAP+AKP - 4 - - - 1 - - - - 
ANAP+CHP - - - - - - - - 1 - 
ANAP+Indep. - 3 - - - - - - - - 
ANAP+Indep+AKP - 1 - - - - - - - - 
ANAP+CHP+SHP - 1 - - - - - - - - 
ANAP+CHP+AKP 1 - - - - - - - - - 
AKP+MHP 1 - - - - - - - - - 
AKP+YTP 1 - 1 - - - - - 1 - 
AKP+FP+RP - 4 - - - - - - - - 
AKP+FP+RP+YTP - 3 - - - - - - - - 
AKP+CHP+Indep. - 1 - - - - - - - - 
AKP+CHP+DSP+M
HP 
- - - - - - 1 - - - 
Independent+DYP 1 1 - - - - - - - - 
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FP+RP 1 - - - - - - - - - 
YTP+DSP - - - 1 - - - - - - 
DYP+YDH - 1 - - - - - - - - 
 
As Table 8 shows, ANAP is prevalent in 7 sectors. Most number of connected 
firms in financial sector. Similarly AKP connections are mostly in financial sector. AKP 
connected firms are in 4 sectors. Just Independent parliamentarian businessmen have 
more connections in manufacturing industry than financial institutions. 
According to Table 9, politically connected firms to multiple parties are also 
mostly in financial and manufacturing industry. In Education sector, BeĢiktaĢ Sport 
Club is the only connected firm.  BeĢiktaĢ is connected with AKP, CHP,DSP and MHP 
at the same time. Although it appears as a politically connected firm with multiple 
parties, no connections with ANAP and BeĢiktaĢ appeared here. 
3.2.Analysis of Connected Individuals: 
According to the merged list of Stock Exchange Istanbul and TGNA the number 
of connected individuals is 112. Among them only two are women confirming with the 
literature on the profiles of elites in Turkey. These 112 individuals are connected to 125 
firms. There are individuals who are connected with more than one firm and more than 
one party. 
Table 10: Number of Connected Individuals and Parties 
 Party No. Of Connected Individuals 
AKP 43 
ANAP 22 
CHP 10 
DSP 1 
DSP+CHP 1 
Independent 7 
Independent+DYP 1 
AKP+FP 1 
AKP+RP+FP 1 
ANAP+Independent 1 
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ANAP+SHP 1 
MHP 5 
YTP 1 
YTP+DSP 1 
CHP+SHP 3 
SHP 1 
DYP 8 
FP 2 
RP+FP 1 
DYP+YDH 1 
TOTAL 112 
 
Among the politically connected individuals, 43 people are connected with 
AKP, 22 people connected with ANAP and 10 connected with CHP, 8 connected with 
DYP, 7 connected with independent and 5 connected with MHP. 11 individuals have 
multiple connections. In these multiple connections 10 people are in at least one right 
wing party. Although the number of firms connected with AKP is less than ANAP 
which is 43 and 27 the number of connected individuals with AKP is more than ANAP 
which is 43 to 22. The reason for this may be that the connections of AKP with the 
firms can be tighter than ANAP’s connections. Thus, AKP could be more influential on 
the decisions of the board of the directors although there are less firms together with 
more number of individuals. ANAP’s connections could be less effective as well.  
ANAP’s connections are more divided between the firms. ANAP is not a party in the 
parliament, lost voters and not an active party,
110
 therefore its influence on the decisions 
of the board of the directors may not be observed today. However, it is possible to say 
that ANAP probably contributed individuals to establish business ties in the past. This 
influence may be lasting even today.  
There are three types of individuals; 24 individuals are in the board of the 
directors of the firms and then they become members of the parliament, 23 individuals 
are both in the parliament and in the board of the directors of the firms at the same time, 
65 individuals are first in the parliamentarians and later in the board of the directors as 
Table 11 shows.  
 
                                                          
110 
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Table 11: Connected individuals and their jobs 
No. of politicians in business 65 
No. of businessmen in politics 24 
No. of Individuals who are at the parliament 
and the board of the directors at the same 
time 
23 
TOTAL 112 
 
However the 65 people who are first at the parliament could be misleading data 
since there are also businessmen in this data; they are not all politicians in business. 
After investigating closely on the biographies of the parliamentarians, one should say 
that there are some businessmen in these individuals. There are 19 individuals among 
them are actually businessmen and later become politicians. However, their firms do not 
appear as politically connected firms if they were on the board of the directors before 
1998 or their firms are not in the Stock Market. The other 45 individuals are first 
worked in bureaucracy than become deputies and later in the board of the directors. 
Among them State Planning Institute, Central Bank and Undersecretaries of Ministries 
are their former job places in bureaucracy as Table 12 below shows in a very detailed 
way. 
Table 12: Politicians in business 
Name of 
Connected 
Ind.
111
 
Firm & Year Party & Term 
No. of 
Terms 
Former 
Occupation 
Individual 1 
Ereğli Demir-Çelik-2000 
 
Yayla Enerji Üretim Turizm 
A.ġ.- 2013, 2014  
ANAP-19, 20 2 Businessman 
Individual  2 
Türkiye ĠĢ Bankası A.ġ.- 
2008, 2009, 2010 
SHP-18, 
CHP-19, 20, 
(24)* 
4 Lawyer 
                                                          
111In this thesis, I  do not provide names of connected individuals. The names of connected individuals can be 
available on request. 
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Individual  3 
Servet Gayrimenkul Yatırım 
Ortaklığı A.ġ.- 2013 
AKP-21, 22, 23 3 
Bureaucrat, 
Provincial Man. 
at Ministry of 
National 
Education, 
Ġstanbul 
Metropolitan 
Municipality, 
Founding Mem. 
of AKP 
Individual 4 
Anadolu Hayat Emeklilik- 
2000 
 
Net Holding-2014 
SHP-18 
CHP - 20, 22, 23 
4 
Architect, Mem. 
of Provincial 
Assembly 
Individual 5 Turkcell-2013, 2014 AKP - 22, 23 2 
Bureaucrat, 
Local Governor 
Individual 6 
Denizbank - 2007, 2008, 
2010, 2011, 2012 
DYP –20, 21 2 
Bureaucrat, 
Undersecretariat 
of Treasury 
Individual 7 
Denge Yatırım Holding- 
2012, 2014 
AKP-23 1 
 Businessman, 
Advisor to the 
Ministry of 
Energy and 
Natural 
Resources 
Individual 8 
Van-Et Gıda- 2011, 2012  
 
Metro Ticari ve Mali 
Yatırımlar Holding-2012 
AKP- 22 1 
Bureaucrat, 
President of 
KOSGEB 
Individual 9 
CeytaĢ Madencilik Tekstil 
Sanayi ve Ticaret Aġ. - 
2005, 2006, 2007 
 
Park Elektrik Üretim 
Madencilik ve Sanayi 
Ticaret A.ġ.-2005, 2006, 
2007  
ANAP- 20 1 
Bureaucrat, 
RTUK 
Individual 10 Nergis Holding-2005, 2007 
DYP- 18,19 
Indep.- 20 
3 Businessman 
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Individual 11 
Vestel Elektronik Sanayi ve 
Ticaret A.ġ. - 2005, 2006, 
2007, 2008, 2009, 2011, 
2012 
 
Vestel Beyaz EĢya Sanayi ve 
Ticaret A.ġ. – 2005, 2006, 
2007, 2009, 2011, 2012 
 
BirleĢik Mağazalar A.ġ.- 
2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 
2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 
 
Albaraka Türk-2007, 2008, 
2010, 2011, 2012 
 
SinpaĢ GMYO-2008, 2010, 
2011, 2012 
 
Saf GMYO-2012, 2013, 
2014, 2015 
 
Ülker Bisküvi Sanayi A.ġ.- 
2012, 2014 
ANAP-18, 19, 20, 
21 
4 
Bureaucrat, 
DPT  
Individual 12 
Tekfen 2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014, 2015 
Indep. - 20 1 
 Bureaycrat, 
Ambassador 
Individual 13 
Uçak Servisi A.ġ.- 2000, 
2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 
2005, 2006, 2007 
 
UsaĢ Yatırımlar Holding 
A.ġ.-2008, 2010, 2011   
ANAP - 19 1 
 Businessman, 
Mem. of Board 
of Directors of 
Gübre A.ġ. 
Individual 14 
ĠĢ Bankası-1998, 1999, 
2000, 2001 
SHP - 18  
CHP-23 
2 
 Bureaucrat, 
DPT 
Individual 15 
Haznedar Refrakter Sanayii- 
2008, 2009, 2012  Indep. - 20 1 
 Engineer/Burea
ucrat, President 
of TOBB 
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Individual 16 
Toprak Finansal Kiralama 
A.ġ.-2005 
 
FFK Fon Finansal Kiralama 
A.ġ. -2006, 2007 
 
Gözde GiriĢim Sermayesi 
Yatırım Ortaklığı-2010 
ANAP - 18, 19, 
20,  
Indep.-21 
4 
 Engineer/Busin
essman 
Individual 17 
GöltaĢ Göller Bölgesi 
Çimento Sanayi ve Ticaret 
A.ġ.- 2009, 2012 
DYP - 18, 19 2 
Engineer/Burea
ucrat, Mayor  
Individual 18 
MEPET  Metro Petrol ve 
Tesisleri A.ġ.- 2013, 2014 
AKP-23 1 Businessman 
Individual 19 
Vakıf Gayrimenkul Yatırım 
Ortaklığı-2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 
2015 
AKP – 22 1  Businessman 
Individual 20 
Net Holding – 2003, 2004, 
2014 
Indep. - 18 1 
Bureaucrat, 
DPT 
Individual 21 
Aksa Akrilik Kimya Sanayii 
A.ġ. – 1999, 2000, 2001, 
2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 
2006, 2007, 2008, 2011 
 
Türk Tuborg Bira ve Malt 
Sanayii A.ġ. – 2001, 2002 
 
Viking Kağıt ve Selüloz 
A.ġ. – 2002, 2003, 2004, 
2005, 2006, 2007 
 
Altınyunus ÇeĢme Turistik 
Tesisler A.ġ. – 2004, 2005, 
2006, 2007 
 
Pınar Su Sanayi ve Ticaret 
A.ġ. – 2005, 2006, 2007 
Indep. - 20 1  Lawyer 
Individual 22 Katmerciler Araç Üstü 
Ekipman Sanayi ve Ticaret 
AKP- 23 1  Lawyer 
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A.ġ. - 2014 
Individual 23 
Rhea GiriĢim Sermayesi 
Yatırım Ortaklığı – 2010, 
2011, 2012 
CHP – 20 1 
Engineer/Burea
ucrat, KOSGEB 
Individual 24 
Yayla Enerji Üretim Turizm 
A.ġ. - 2013, 2014 
ANAP - 20 1  Businessman 
Individual 25 
Sabancı Holding – 2012, 
2014 
ANAP - 18, 19, 
20, 21 
4 
 Bureaucrat, 
DPT 
Individual 26 
Katmerciler Araç Üstü 
Ekipman Sanayi ve Ticaret 
A.ġ. – 2013, 2014 
AKP – 22 1 
Businessman 
Founding 
Member of 
AKP, 
Nephew of 
Turgut Özal 
Individual 27 
Ġhlas Holding A.ġ. – 2004, 
2005, 2006, 2007 
ANAP - 18 
1 
 Bureaucrat, 
DSĠ 
Individual 28 
Vakıf Gayrimenkul Yatırım 
Ortaklığı 2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012 
 
GüneĢ Sigorta – 2012, 2013, 
2014 
 
Vakıflar Bankası – 2014 
AKP - 21, 22 2 
Lawyer 
 
 
Individual 29 
Katmerciler Araç Üstü 
Ekipman Sanayi ve Ticaret 
A.ġ. – 2012, 2013, 2014 AKP - 22, 23 2 
Businessman, 
Katmerciler 
A.ġ., Mem. of 
Board of 
Directors 
Individual 30 
ĠĢ Bankası – 2008, 2009, 
2010 
CHP - 20, 22 2  Lawyer 
Individual 31 
Fibabanka A.ġ. - 2013 
Finansbank A.ġ. – 2003, 
2004, 2005 
ANAP–18, 19, 20 3 
Bureaucrat, 
Gen. Dir. of 
SSK 
Individual 32 
TÜPRAġ-Türkiye Petrol 
Rafinerileri A.ġ. – 2002, 
2004 
FP – 20 1 
Bureaucrat, 
DPT 
Individual 33 Bilici Yatırım – 2011, 2012, 
ANAP - 18, 20, 
3 Businessman 
 37 
 
2013, 2014  21 
Individual 34 
 Tek Art Holding - 2004 
Indep. - 19 1 
 Engineer/Busin
essman 
Individual 35 
Türk Hava Yolları Anonim 
Ortaklığı – 1999, 2002 
 
Hürriyet Gazetesi – 2004, 
2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 
2009, 2010 
 
Coca Cola Ġçecek – 2006, 
2007, 2008, 2010, 2011, 
2012 
 
Anadolu Efes – 2007, 2008, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014, 2015 
 
TAV Havalimanları Holding 
– 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2012 
 
Yazıcılar Holding – 2007, 
2008, 2010, 2011, 2012 
 
Pegasus Hava TaĢımacılığı – 
2014 
ANAP - 19 1 Businessman 
Individual 36 
Konya Çimento – 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 
 
BaĢtaĢ BaĢkent Çimento 
Sanayi ve Ticaret A.ġ. – 
2012, 2015  
AKP - 22 1 
Bureaucrat, 
DPT 
Individual 37 
Türk Prysmian Kablo ve 
Sistemleri Aġ. – 2012, 2013, 
2014, 2015 
AKP - 22, 23 2  Tax Accountant 
Individual 38 Turkcell – 2013, 2014 AKP - 22, 23 2 Engineer/ Burea
ucrat, 
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Tekstilbank - 2015 
TÜBĠTAK, 
ETĠBANK, 
ĠGDAġ 
Founding 
member of AKP 
Individual 39 
FeniĢ Alüminyum – 2011, 
2012, 2013, 2014 
Indep. - 20 1 
 Businessman, 
Pres,dent of 
TALSAD, ĠKV, 
Türk-Amerikan 
ĠĢ Konseyi, 
Boarding Mem. 
of ĠSO, DEĠK, 
TĠSK 
Individual 40 GentaĢ – 2012, 2013, 2014 FP – 20 1 
 Engineer/Busin
essman/Bureauc
rat, President of 
TÜMOSAN, 
GENTAġ, 
BELTAġ 
Individual 41 
Ayen Enerji A.ġ. – 2012, 
2014 
DSP – 20 
YTP – 21 
2  Lawyer 
Individual 42 
Nuh Çimento - 2010 
AKP – 22 1 
Businessman 
Owner, Nuh 
Çimento 
Individual 43 
Ulusoy Elektrik Ġmalat 
Taahüt ve Ticaret - 2014 
ANAP – 18, 20, 
21 
3  Lawyer 
Individual 44 
Bereket Finansal Kiralama - 
2014 
 
Ziraat Finansal Kiralama – 
2013 
 
T.C. Ziraat Banası A.ġ. – 
2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 
AKP – 23 1 
Bureaucrat 
Local Governor, 
Provincial 
Governor, 
Mayor 
Individual 45 
GöltaĢ Göller Bölgesi 
Çimento Sanayi ve Ticaret 
A.ġ. – 2012, 2014 
DYP – 19 1 
Engineer/ 
Businessman  
Individual 46 Denizbank – 2006, 2007 YDH-19, DYP-18 2 Businessman 
Individual 47 Türkiye ĠĢ Bankası A.ġ. – SHP – 18 1  Tax Accountant 
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1998, 1999, 2000, 2001  
Individual 48 
Gözde GiriĢim Sermayesi 
Yatırım Ortaklığı – 2012, 
2013, 2014, 
 
SinpaĢ Gayrimenkul Yatırım 
Ortaklığı A.ġ. - 2014 
AKP - 22, 23 2 
Professor,  
Gen. Dir. of TC. 
Vakıflar 
Bankası 
Individual 49 
Aksa Akrilik Kimya Sanayii 
A.ġ. - 1998, 1999, 2000, 
2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 
2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 
2009, 2011 
DYP - 19 1 
Lawyer/Bureauc
rat-Chief of 
Police/ Local 
Governor 
Individual 50 
UĢak Seramik – 2012, 2014 
AKP – 23 1 
 Engineer/ 
Bureaucrat at 
Ministry of 
Forestry 
Individual 51 
Katmerciler Araç Üstü 
Ekipman Sanayi ve Ticaret 
A.ġ. – 2012, 2013, 2014 
AKP – 22 1 
Bureaucrat, 
DPT  
Individual 52 
Ulusoy Un Sanayi ve Ticaret 
A.ġ. - 2014 
RP - 19  
FP – 20 
2 
Bureaucrat, Dir. 
of Religious 
Affairs, 
Provincial 
Manager at 
ĠġKUR 
Individual 53 
Otokar – 2003, 2004, 2005 
 
Yapı ve Kredi Bankası – 
2005, 2006 
 
Yapıkredi Sigorta – 2006 
 
Yapıkredi Finansal Kiralama 
- 2006, 2007 
 
Koç Tüketici Finansmanı 
A.ġ. – 2006,2007 
 
Tekfen – 2007, 2008, 2009, 
ANAP - 20 1 
Bureaucrat, 
Governor of 
Central Bank 
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2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 
Individual 54 
ĠĢ Bankası – 1998, 1999, 
2000, 2001, 2004 
 
ĠĢ GiriĢim Sermaye - 2004 
 
Anadolu Sigorta – 2005, 
2006, 2007 
ANAP - 19 1 
Bureaucrat, 
FĠSKOBĠRLĠK  
Individual 55 
Kardemir Karabük Demir 
Çelik - 2001 DYP - 18,DYP – 
19 
2 
Engineer/Burea
ucrat, Deputy 
Gen. Dir. of 
ISDEMIR 
Individual 56 
Çimbeton Hazır ve Prefabrik 
Yapı Elemanları Sanayi 
Ticaret A.ġ. – 2012, 2013, 
2014 
ÇimentaĢ Ġzmir Çimento 
Fabrikası – 2012, 2013, 
2014 
Katmerciler Araç Üstü 
Ekipman Sanayi ve Ticaret 
A.ġ. - 2012 
AKP – 23 1 Businessman 
Individual 57 
KerevitaĢ Gıda – 2012, 2015 
 
Makina Takım Endüstri A.ġ. 
 – 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 
 
BĠM BirleĢik Mağazalar – 
2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 
 
FFK Fon Finansal Kiralama 
A.ġ. – 2013, 2014 
ANAP - 18 1 Businessman 
Individual 58 
Metro Menkul Kıymetler 
Yatırım Ortaklığı – 2006, 
2007, 2008 
YTP – 21 1 
 Private 
Sector/Bureaucr
at, SPK 
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Van-Et Gıda - 2006, 2007, 
2008, 2011, 2012 
 
Metal Gayrimenkul – 2007, 
2008, 2010, 2011, 2012,  
 
Metro Ticari ve Mali 
Yatırımlar Holding – 2008, 
2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013 
 
Avrasya Petrol ve TuristĠk 
Tesisler Yatırımlar A.ġ. , 
2009 
 
Avrasya Gayrimenkul 
Yatırım Ortaklığı – 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 
 
Atlas Menkul Kıymetler 
Yatırım Ortaklığı – 2012, 
2013, 2014 
Individual59 
Vakıf Finansal Kiralama – 
2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 
AKP- 22 1  Lawyer 
Individual 60 
Mudurnu Tavukçuluk A.ġ. – 
1999, 2000, 2001 
DYP – 19 1 Businessman 
Individual 61 
CeytaĢ Madencilik Tekstil 
Sanayi ve Ticaret A.ġ. – 
2002, 2003 
CHP – 20 1  Private Sector 
Individual 62 UĢak Seramik - 2015 AKP – 23 1 Businessman 
Individual 63 
Petkim Petrokimya Holding 
A.ġ. – 1998 
ANAP-18,19 2 
Bureaucrat, 
DPT   
Individual 64 
Zorlu Enerji – 2006 ANAP – 19, 20, 
21  
3  Lawyer 
Individual 65 
Toprak Finansal Kiralama 
A.ġ. - 2005 
FFK Fon Finansal Kiralama 
ANAP - 19 1 
Bureaucrat, 
Gen. Dir. of 
DPT 
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A.ġ. – 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012  
Gözde GiriĢim Sermayesi 
Yatırım Ortaklığı – 2012, 
2013, 2014 
 
Like in other parts of the world there are revolving doors and reverse revolving 
doors cases. There are politicians that became businessmen after they became deputies 
in the parliament. There are also businessmen continue to political jobs. There are 
individuals who became deputies for more than one period or became ministers or local 
governors. There are businessmen become deputies for one period. Then continue to 
work as businessmen. SPK law may have influenced connections. They gave SPK to 
right to appoint members to board of the directors. For example there are individuals as 
former politicians appointed to Turkcell as the members of the board of the directors by 
SPK.
112
 There are individuals came from business background and some come from 
other jobs and became member of board of the directors after becoming politicians as it 
can be followed from Table 13.  
Table 13: Businessmen in Politics 
Name of 
Connected. 
Ind.
113
 
Firm & Year 
Party & 
Term 
No. of 
Terms 
Former Occupation 
Individual 66 
Ereğli Demir Çelik 
- 2000 
CHP – 24 1 
Doctor/Bureaucrat Ministry of 
Health 
Individual 67 
Gübre Fabrikaları 
T.A.ġ. - 2004, 
2005, 2006, 2007, 
2008, 2009 
AKP – 24 1 
Teacher/Bureaucrat, Gen. Dir. 
of Türkiye Tarım Kredi 
Kooperatifleri Merkez Birliği 
Individual 68 
Hürriyet Gazetesi - 
1998 
DitaĢ Doğan Ġmalat 
ve Teknik - 1998 
Türk DıĢ Ticaret 
Bankası - 1998 
ANAP – 21 1 
Engineer/Bureaucrat Pres. Of 
TCDD, TEK  
Individual69 
Net Holding – 
2005, 2006, 2014 AKP – 23 1 
Bureaucrat, Ministry of 
Tourism, Provincial 
Governor, Chief of Police, 
Individual70 
Aselsan Elektronik 
Sanayi ve Ticaret - 
2006 
MHP – 24 1 Military Professional 
Individual71 Emlak Konut AKP -24  1 Engineer/Bureaucrat, Pres. of 
                                                          
112"SPK'dan Turkcelle flaĢ atama" http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/24527219.asp; "SPK Turkcell yetkisini aldı", 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/23675813.asp;Turkcell' e iki eski bakan, 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/22791079.asp. 
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Gayrimenkul 
Yatırım Ortaklığı, 
2000 
KĠPTAġ, TOKĠ 
Individual72 
 
Vakıf Finansal 
Kiralama – 1999, 
2012 
 
Türkiye Sınai ve 
Kalkınma Bankası 
– 2012, 2013, 2015 
 
Vakıflar Bankası -  
2012, 2013, 2014, 
2015,  
 
Vakıf Gayrimenkul 
Yatırım Ortaklığı - 
2012 
 
GüneĢ Sigorta – 
2013, 2014, 2015 
AKP – 22, 
23 
2 Private Sector 
Individual73 
Gübre Fabrikaları 
T.A.ġ. - 1998 
MHP – 21 1 
Bureaucrat, TARĠġ, Tarım 
Kredi Kooperatifi 
Individual74 
Türk 
Telekomünikasyon 
A.ġ. – 2009, 2010, 
2011 
AKP -24  1 
Engineer/Lawyer/Bureaucrat 
at Ministry of Culture and 
Türk Telekom 
Individual75 
Gübre Fabrikaları 
T.A.ġ. - 1998 
MHP - 21 1 
Bureaucrat, Tarım Kredi 
Kooperatifi 
Individual76 
T.C. Ziraat Bankası 
A.ġ. – 2012, 2013, 
2014, 2015 
AKP – 22 1 
Private Sector/Bureaucrat, 
Founding Pres. of IMKB 
Individual77 
Türkiye Kalkınma 
Bankası - 1998 
ANAP – 22 1 
Bureaucrat, Ministry of 
Finance, SPK, DDK 
Individual78 
Türkiye ĠĢ Bankası 
A.ġ. – 1998, 1999, 
2000, 2001 
CHP – 22, 
23 
2 
Private Sector, Gen.Dir. of 
Petrol Ofisi, TÜRMOB 
Individual79 
Yapı ve Kredi 
Bankası – 2004 
 
Yapıkredi Finansal 
Kiralama , 2004 
AKP - 23 1 
Lawyer, Boarding member of 
Ziraat, Halk, Yapı ve Kred 
Bankası 
Individual80 
Türk Hava Yolları 
A.O. – 2002, 2003 
AKP – 23, 
24 
2 Bureaucrat 
Individual81 
Ereğli Demirçelik – 
2002, 2003, 2004 
AKP – 23, 
24 
2 
Bureaucrat, Deputy General 
Dir. of ISKI 
Individual82 
Gübre Fabrikaları 
T.A.ġ.- 1998 , 
1999, 2000, 2001 
MHP – 24 1 Bureaucrat 
Individual83 
ĠĢ Bankası – 2008, 
2009, 2010 
Anadolu Hayat 
Emeklilik – 2011, 
2012, 2013, 2014, 
2015 
CHP – 22 1 Lawyer 
Individual84 
Parsan Makine 
Parçaları - 1998 
AKP – 22, 
23 
2 
Engineer/Bureaucrat, General 
Secretary of TBMM 
Individual85 
Emlak Konut 
Gayrimenkul 
AKP – 24 1 
Bureaucrat, Board Member or 
TOKĠ 
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Yatırım Ortaklığı - 
2010 
 
Individual86 
Doğusan Boru – 
2003, 2004, 2006, 
2006 
AKP - 23, 
24 
2 
Bureaucrat, Ġstanbul 
Metropolitan Municipality 
Ministry of Public Works and 
Settlement 
Individual87 
ġekerbank – 1998, 
1999, 2000, 2001 
CHP – 22 1 Businessman 
Individual88 
Medya Holding - 
1998 
Sabah Pazarlama - 
1998 
Sabah Yayıncılık - 
1998 
ANAP – 21 1 Journalist 
Individual89 
Vakıf Gayrimenkul 
Yatırım Ortaklığı – 
2008, 2009, 2010 
AKP – 24 1 Lawyer 
 
The average terms in the parliament of the politically connected individuals is 
1,65
114
. The average term of politicians in business is 1,66; the average term of 
businessmen politicians is 1,25 and the individuals who are both at the parliament and 
the board of the directors is 2.04. As a result, it seems like the individuals first in 
business than in politics relatively stayed less periods in the parliament. The others look 
like that they are more like career politicians.  
Table 14: Average term in the parliament of politically connected individuals 
Connected Individuals Average Term in the Parliament 
Politicians in business 1,66 
Businessmen in politics 1,25 
Individuals who are at the parliament and the 
board of the directors at the same time 
2,04 
Total 1,65 
 
Usually businessmen politicians continue with their business career later. They 
stay in the parliament relatively shorter terms. They go back to their “real jobs”115 Some 
of them do not see politics as their job.  There are also people who became local 
governors and people who continue being active in the party.  Therefore, it could be 
                                                          
114 I start to count from 18th legislative term. I did not count earlier legislative terms if the parliamentarians are in the 
parliament before 18th term. 
115http://www.haberler.com/sinan-aygun-kilicdaroglu-ndan-sikinti-yasamasi-7168400-haberi/ 
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possible to say that although an individual’s term in the parliament ends, his or her 
connection may continue. Moreover, for businessmen individuals it could be enough to 
enter into the parliament once, because they will be able to get social benefits and 
establish networks with the politicians. They will get once privileged information of the 
politics. Maybe there is no need for them to stay in the parliament for more terms. 
 Moreover, while calculating the number of politically connected firms in Table 
4, I assumed that it is enough for the firms fulfilling just one criterion of being 
politically connected. This method, however, may be incomplete. To put it more clearly, 
for example if there is an individual who was in the board of the directors of firm X in 
2002 and then she/he became a parliamentarian in 2011, I count this firm as politically 
connected in 2002. Another case is that if a person is a parliamentarian in 2002, and 
she/he is in a board of the directors of a company in 2015, I counted this firm as 
politically connected in 2015. Thirdly, if an individual is in the parliament in 2002 and 
she/he is also a member of the board of the directors at the same time, I counted this 
firm as politically connected in 2002.  When political connections start and end cannot 
be understood. Table 15below shows political connections when individuals are both in 
the board of the directors and firms at the same time through different years. 
 
Table 15: Politically connected firms with individuals are both in the parliament 
and in the board of the directors (1998-2015) 
Year Connected 
Individual 
Legislative 
Term 
Party Company Sector 
1998 Individual 90 21 ANAP 
Türk Hava 
Yolları 
 
Transportation, 
Communication 
and Storage 
 
 
Individual 91 20 ANAP 
Akbank 
 
Financial 
Institutions 
 
 
Individual 92 20 DSP 
Kipa 
 
Wholesale and 
Retail Trade, 
Hotels and 
Restaurants 
 
 
Individual 93 20 DYP 
1. Sönmez 
Filament 
Sentetik Ġplik 
ve Elyaf 
Sanayi 
Anonim 
ġirketi 
 
1. Real Estate 
Activities 
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2. Sönmez 
Pamuklu 
Sanayii 
 
2.Manufacturing 
Industry 
 
 
Individual 94 
 
20 
 
DYP 
 
Ak Al Tekstil 
 
Manufacturing 
Industry 
 
1999 
 
Individual 95 
 
20 ANAP 
1. MĠLPA 
Ticari ve Sınai 
Ürünler 
 
2. DitaĢ Doğan 
Ġmalat ve 
Teknik 
3. Çelik Halat 
 
1. Wholesale and 
Retail Trade, 
Hotels and 
Restaurants 
2.Manufacturing 
Industry 
3.Manufacturing 
Industry 
 
 
Individual 91 
 
20 ANAP Akbank 
Financial 
Institutions 
 
 
Individual 93 
 
20 
 
DYP 
 
1. Sönmez 
Filament 
Sentetik Ġplik 
ve Elyaf 
Sanayi 
Anonim 
ġirketi 
 
2. Sönmez 
Pamuklu 
Sanayii 
 
1. Real Estate 
Activities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Manufacturing 
Industry 
 
 
Individual 94 
 
20 
 
DYP 
 
Ak Al Tekstil 
 
Manufacturing 
Industry 
 
 Individual 96 
 
20 
 
Bağımsız 
 
Toprakbank 
 
Financial 
Institutions 
2000 - - - - - 
2001 - - - - - 
2002 
Individual 97 
 
22 
 
AKP 
 
BeĢiktaĢ 
Futbol Yatırım 
 
Education, 
Health, Sports 
and Other 
Services 
 
 
Individual 98 
 
22 
 
CHP 
 
Kartonsan 
 
Manufacturing 
Industry 
 
 
Individual 99 
 
22 
 
CHP 
 
Alternatif 
Bank 
 
Financial 
Institutions 
 
2003 
Individual 100 
 
22 
 
AKP 
 
1.Info Menkul 
Kıymetler 
Yatırım 
Ortaklığı 
2. Info Trend 
B Tipi Yatırım 
Ortaklığı A.ġ. 
 
1.Financial 
Institutions 
 
 
2.Financial 
Institutions 
 
 
Individual 98 
 
22 
 
CHP 
 
Kartonsan 
 
Manufacturing 
Industry 
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2004 
Individual 100 
 
22 
 
AKP 
 
1.Info Menkul 
Kıymetler 
Yatırım 
Ortaklığı 
2. Info Trend 
B Tipi Yatırım 
Ortaklığı A.ġ. 
 
1.Financial 
Institutions 
 
 
2.Financial 
Institutions 
 
 
Individual 98 
 
22 
 
CHP 
 
Kartonsan 
 
Manufacturing 
Industry 
 
2005 
Individual 100 
 
22 
 
AKP 
 
1.Info Menkul 
Kıymetler 
Yatırım 
Ortaklığı 
2. Info Trend 
B Tipi Yatırım 
Ortaklığı A.ġ. 
 
1.Financial 
Institutions 
 
 
2.Financial 
Institutions 
 
 
Individual 98 
 
22 
 
CHP 
 
Kartonsan 
 
Manufacturing 
Industry 
 
2006 
Individual 100 
 
22 
 
AKP 
 
1.Info Menkul 
Kıymetler 
Yatırım 
Ortaklığı 
2. Info Trend 
B Tipi Yatırım 
Ortaklığı A.ġ. 
 
1.Financial 
Institutions 
 
 
2.Financial 
Institutions 
 
 
Individual 98 
 
22 CHP 
Kartonsan Manufacturing 
Industry 
 
2007 Individual 100 22 AKP 
1.Info Menkul 
Kıymetler 
Yatırım 
Ortaklığı 
2. Info Trend 
B Tipi Yatırım 
Ortaklığı A.ġ. 
3.YeĢil 
Yatırım 
Ortaklığı 
 
1.Financial 
Institutions 
 
 
2.Financial 
Institutions 
 
3. Financial 
Institutions 
 
 
Individual 98 
 
23 
 
CHP 
 
Kartonsan 
 
Manufacturing 
Industry 
 
 
Individual 101 
 
23 
 
MHP 
 
BeĢiktaĢ 
Futbol Yatırım 
 
Education, 
Health, Sports 
and Other 
Services 
 
2008 
 
Individual 98 
 
23 
 
CHP 
 
Kartonsan 
 
Manufacturing 
Industry 
 
 
Individual 101 
 
23 
 
MHP 
 
BeĢiktaĢ 
Futbol Yatırım 
 
Education, 
Health, Sports 
and Other 
Services 
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2009 
 
Individual 102 
 
23 
 
AKP 
 
1.MEPET  
Metro Petrol 
ve Tesisleri 
A.ġ. 
 
2. Avrasya 
Petrol ve 
TuristĠk 
Tesisler 
Yatırımlar A.ġ. 
 
1. Wholesale and 
Retail Trade, 
Hotels and 
Restaurants 
 
2.Wholesale and 
Retail Trade, 
Hotels and 
Restaurants 
 
 
Individual 98 
 
23 
 
CHP 
 
Kartonsan 
 
Manufacturing 
Industry 
 
 
Individual 101 
 
23 
 
MHP 
 
 
BeĢiktaĢ 
Futbol Yatırım 
 
Education, 
Health, Sports 
and Other 
Services 
 
2010 
Individual 102 
 
23 
 
AKP 
 
MEPET  Metro 
Petrol ve 
Tesisleri A.ġ. 
 
Wholesale and 
Retail Trade, 
Hotels and 
Restaurants 
 
 
Individual 98 
 
23 CHP Kartonsan 
Manufacturing 
Industry 
 
2011 
Individual 103 
 
24 
 
AKP 
 
Vakıfbank 
 
Financial 
Institutions 
 
 
Individual 104 
 
23 
 
AKP 
 
MEPET  Metro 
Petrol ve 
Tesisleri A.ġ. 
 
Wholesale and 
Retail Trade, 
Hotels and 
Restaurants 
 
 
Individual 105 
 
24 
 
AKP 
 
Vakıf Yatırım 
Ortaklığı 
 
Financial 
Institutions 
 
 
Individual 106 
 
24 
 
CHP 
 
BeĢiktaĢ 
Futbol Yatırım 
 
Education, 
Health, Sports 
and Other 
Services 
 
2012 
Individual 107 
 
24 
 
AKP 
 
Kombassan 
Holding 
 
Financial 
Institutions 
 
 
Individual 106 
 
24 
 
CHP 
 
BeĢiktaĢ 
Futbol Yatırım 
 
Education, 
Health, Sports 
and Other 
Services 
 
2013 
Individual 107 
 
24 
 
AKP 
 
Kombassan 
Holding 
 
Financial 
Institutions 
 
 
Individual 108 
 
24 
 
 
CHP 
 
Panora 
Gayrimenkul 
Yatırım 
Ortaklığı A.ġ. 
 
Financial 
Institutions 
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2014 Individual 107 24 AKP 
Kombassan 
Holding 
Financial 
Institutions 
 
 
Individual 109 
 
24 
 
AKP 
 
Kütahya 
Porselen 
 
Manufacturing 
Industry 
 
 
Individual 108 
 
24 CHP 
Panora 
Gayrimenkul 
Yatırım 
Ortaklığı A.ġ. 
 
Financial 
Institutions 
 
2015 
Individual 110 
 
24 AKP 
Kombassan 
Holding 
Financial 
Institutions 
 
 
Individual 107 
 
24 AKP 
Kombassan 
Holding 
Financial 
Institutions 
 
 
Individual 111 
 
24 AKP 
Kütahya 
Porselen 
Manufacturing 
Industry 
 
 
Individual 109 
 
24 AKP 
Kütahya 
Porselen 
 
Manufacturing 
Industry 
 
 
Individual 112 
 
24 AKP 
Kütahya 
Porselen 
Manufacturing 
Industry 
 
    
 
In Table 15, the total number of politically connected firms is 24 between 1998-
2015. There are 10 firms in financial institutions; 7 in manufacturing industry; 4 in 
wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants; 1 firm in education, health, sports and 
other services; 1 in real estate activities and; 1 firm in transportation, communication 
and storage sector. The total number of individuals is 23. There are 20 individuals 
connected to one firm and 4 individuals connected to multiple firms. Also, 20 firms 
connected to one individual and 4 firms are connected to more than one individual. 
There is no politically connected firms which includes an individual board of 
directors and the parliament at the same time in the 18
th
 (1987-1991) and 19
th 
 (1991-
1995) legislative terms because there is no data and also the data is incomplete for 20
th
 
Legislative Term (1996-1999) since no data is available before 1998. The number of 
connected firms in 20
th 
Legislative Term is 9, in 21
st
 Legislative Term is one, in 22
nd
 
Legislative term is 6, in 23th Legislative Term is 4, in 24
th
 Legislative Term is 6.  
In 20
th
 Legislative term there are 4 firms in manufacturing sector, 2 firms in 
financial institutions, 2 firms in wholesale sector, 1 real estate. In 21
st
 Legislative term 
there are only 1 politically connected firm which is in transportation, communication 
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and storage sector. In 22
nd
 Legislative Term there are 4 politically connected firms in 
financial institutions sector, 1 politically connected firm in manufacturing industry and 
1 politically connected firm in education, health, sports and other services industry. In 
23
rd
 Legislative Term there are 2 connected firms in wholesale sector, 1 connected firm 
in manufacturing industry, 1 firm is connected in education, health, sports and other 
services industry.  Lastly, In 24
th
 Legislative Term, there are 4 politically connected 
firms in financial institutions, 1 firm in manufacturing industry, and 1 firm in education, 
health, sports and other services industry. 
The politically connected firms and the parties are; 10 firms are connected with 
AKP, 5 firms are connected with ANAP, 4 firms are connected to CHP, 3 firms are 
connected with DYP, 3 firms are connected with CHP, and 1firm connected with DSP. 
In addition 1 firm is connected with an independent deputy, and 1 firm is connected 
with multiple parties AKP, CHP and MHP. There is no connected party with FP, RP 
and YTP. The right wing parties have the most number of connections. Besides, CHP 
connections are 2 in financial institutions sector, 1 in manufacturing sector, 1 in 
education, health sports and other activities. Therefore, CHP is not dominant in any of 
the sectors across legislative terms. AKP, however has dominance in finance sector with 
6 connections. Besides, BeĢiktaĢ is politically connected with multiple parties AKP, 
MHP, CHP in 22
nd
, 23rd, 24th Legislative Terms, respectively. This is an interesting 
case to note since the company has different connections with different parties in all 
three legislative terms. It is the only football club with political connections in the stock 
market.   
Among connected individuals, between the cabinets of 45
th
 and 62
nd
 , there are 
29 ministers with 37 connections; 15 ministers of state, 4 ministers of Energy and 
Natural Resources, 4 ministers of Environment and Urban Planning, 2 Culture and 
Tourism Ministers, 2 ministers of Food, Agriculture and Livestock, 3 deputy prime 
ministers and 1 chair of assembly. There is no Prime Minister as politically connected. 
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Table 16: Connected Individuals as Ministers 
Ministery Name of Connected 
Individuals 
Party of 
Connected 
Individuals 
Cabinet No. of Connected 
Individuals 
Culture and Tourism Individual 46 
Individual 5 
DYP, YDH 
AKP 
46 
59 
2 
Customs and Trade Individual 11 ANAP 47 1 
Development - -  - 
Economy - -  - 
Energy and Natural 
Resources 
Individual 55 
Individual 43 
Individual 38 
DYP 
 
ANAP 
AKP 
51, 52 
 
57 
58, 59 
3 
Environment and Urban 
Planning (Bayındırlık ve 
Ġskan Bak.) 
Individual 2 
Individual 71 
Individual 40 
CHP 
AKP 
FP 
52 
61 
54 
3 
European Union - -  - 
Family and Social 
Policy 
- 
- 
 
- 
Finance - -  - 
Food, Agriculture and 
Livestock 
Individual 94 DYP 51, 52 
1 
Foreign Affairs Individual 109 DYP, Indep. 53 1 
Forest and Water 
Management 
Individual 16 ANAP,Indep. 55 
1 
Health Individual 94 DYP 54 1 
Interior  - -  - 
Justice Individual 21 DYP, Indep. 55 1 
Labor and Social 
Security 
Individual 80 AKP 
60 
1 
National Defense Individual 49 DYP 49, 50 2 
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Individual 74 AKP 61, 62 
National Education, 
Youth and Sports 
Individual 63 
Individual 20 
Individual 41 
ANAP 
 
ANAP,Indep. 
YTP, DSP 
48, 49 
 
46 
56, 57 
3 
Science, Industry and 
Technology (San. ve 
Tic. Bak.) 
Individual 15 DYP, Indep. 53, 54, 55 
1 
Transport, Maritime 
Affairs and 
Communications 
Individual 11 
Individual 74* 
ANAP 
AKP 
46 
59 
2 
Ministry of State: 
 
Economy 
 
 
Employment, Science, 
Technology(TÜBĠTAK) 
 
Environment, Petrol 
 
 
Foreign Trade, 
Eximbank, Customs 
 
Privatization 
 
TEKEL 
 
Treasury 
 
Treasury and Foreign 
Trade 
 
 
Individual 31 
Individual 25 
 
Individual 46 
 
 
Individual 63 
 
 
Individual 91 
 
Individual 64 
 
Individual 94 
 
Individual 53 
 
Individual 6 
 
 
ANAP 
ANAP 
 
DYP, YDH 
 
 
ANAP 
 
 
ANAP 
 
ANAP 
 
DYP 
 
ANAP 
 
DYP 
 
 
45, 46 
47, 55 
 
45 
 
 
45, 47 
 
 
53 
 
57 
 
50, 54 
 
53 
 
53, 54 
14 
 53 
 
 
Treasury, Ziraat Bank 
 
Youth and Sports 
 
 
 
 
 
Individual 10 
 
Individual 63 
Individual 20 
Individual 34 
Individual 16 
Individual 106 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DYP, Indep. 
 
ANAP 
ANAP,Indep. 
DYP, Indep. 
ANAP,Indep. 
AKP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
49, 51, 52 
 
45, 47 
45 
49, 50 
53 
57 
Deputy PM Individual 31 
Individual 11 
ANAP 
ANAP 
45, 46 
46, 48 
 
 
 One explanation for why connected individuals are energy ministers is 
manufacturing industry is the sector which is dependent very much to energy. 
Especially being energy ministers can give them agenda setting power in the executive 
body of the government.  
 In 2011 Ministry of State is changed. Some ministries of state became regular 
ministries
116
. There are also ministries can be outside of the cabinet. Individual 74. the 
only one among these ministers is the one outside of the cabinet. Ministries connected 
to sports clubs became cabinet members and became ministers of state in charge of 
youth and supports. No ministers of interior among the connected individuals. I get the 
data of cabinet from web pages of TGNA and Prime Ministry
117
.  
It is also possible to look at the Committees in the parliament. Committees in the 
parliament may affect the agenda setting power in legislative body of the government. 
                                                          
116 Sayarı and Dikici Bilgin, p. 2 
117 Hükûmetler, https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kutuphane/e_kaynaklar_kutuphane_hukumetler.html 
;Bakanlar Kurulu, http://www.basbakanlik.gov.tr/Forms/_Global/_Government/pg_Cabinet.aspx 
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They can manipulate the law proposals according to their business interests. Since many 
of them are in budget and planning commission. They can affect budgetary decisions of 
the parliament according to sectors of their firms. The connected individuals in the 
commissions of the Parliament may manipulate the decisions given by the committees 
according to their business interests, or according to interests of the sectors.  They may 
cause to making law which may benefit their firm of the sector. 
Table 17: Politically connected individuals as Members of Committees in the 
Parliament 
Committees Connected Individuals Party 
No. of 
Connected 
Individuals 
Agriculture, 
Foresty and Rural 
Affairs 
Individual 109 AKP 1 
Constitution 
 
Individual 5 
 
Individual 28 
 
Individual 44 
 
Individual 89 
 
Individual 25 
 
Individual 31 
 
Individual 64 
 
Individual 2 
 
Individual 41 
 
Individual 21 
 
 
AKP 
 
AKP 
 
AKP 
 
AKP 
 
ANAP 
 
ANAP 
 
ANAP 
 
CHP, SHP 
 
YTP, DSP 
 
Indep. 
10 
 
Environment 
 
 
Individual 107 
 
Individual 17 
 
Individual 40 
 
 
AKP 
 
DYP 
 
FP 
3 
 
Equal Opportunity 
for Women and 
Men 
 
- - - 
 
EU Harmonization 
 
Individual 26 
 
Individual 76 
 
 
AKP 
 
AKP 
 
 
4 
 55 
 
Individual 56 
 
Individual 112 
 
AKP 
 
AKP, FP 
 
Foreign Affairs 
 
Individual 36 (chair) 
 
Individual 63 (chair) 
 
Individual 39 (chair) 
 
Individual 110 
 
Individual 35 
 
Individual 33 
 
Individual 91 
 
Individual 64 
 
Individual 16 
 
 
Individual 6 
 
 
AKP 
 
ANAP 
 
Indep. 
 
AKP 
 
ANAP 
 
ANAP 
 
ANAP 
 
ANAP 
 
ANAP, 
Indep. 
 
DYP 
10 
Health, Family, 
Labor and Social 
Affairs 
 
Individual 66 
 
Individual 101 
 
 
CHP 
 
MHP 
 
2 
Human Rights 
Inquiry 
 
Individual 19 
 
Individual 108 
 
Individual 46 
 
AKP 
 
CHP 
 
DYP,YDH 
 
3 
Industry, Trade, 
Energy, Natural 
Resources, 
Information and 
Technology 
 
 
Individual 33 
 
Individual 91 
 
Individual 55 
 
Individual 40 
 
Individual 21 
 
 
ANAP 
 
ANAP 
 
DYP 
 
FP 
 
Indep. 
5 
Internal Affairs 
 
Individual 16 
 
 
Individual 106 
 
ANAP, 
Indep. 
 
DSP,CHP 
 
2 
Justice 
 
 
Individual 105 
 
Individual 89 
 
 
AKP 
 
AKP 
 
4 
 56 
 
Individual 11 
 
Individual 43 
ANAP 
 
ANAP 
 
National Defense 
 
Individual 97 
 
Individual 89 
 
Individual 11 
 
Individual 33 
 
Individual 70 
 
Individual 47 
 
 
AKP 
 
AKP 
 
ANAP 
 
ANAP 
 
MHP 
 
SHP 
6 
National 
Education, Culture, 
Youth and Sport 
 
Individual 3 
 
Individual 100 
 
AKP 
 
AKP,RP, 
FP 
2 
Petitions 
 
Individual 3 
 
Individual 89 
 
Individual 16 
 
 
Individual 64 
 
Individual 14 
 
Individual 94 
 
AKP 
 
AKP 
 
ANAP, 
Indep. 
 
ANAP 
 
CHP,SHP 
 
DYP 
 
6 
Plan and Budget 
 
Individual 81 (chair) 
 
Individual 104 (chair) 
 
Individual 112 (chair) 
 
Individual 111 
 
Individual 72 
 
Individual 105 
 
Individual 9 
 
Individual 11 
 
Individual 25 
 
Individual 98 
 
Individual 99 
 
Individual 78 
 
AKP 
 
AKP 
 
 
AKP, FP 
 
AKP 
 
AKP 
 
AKP 
 
ANAP 
 
ANAP 
 
ANAP 
 
CHP  
 
CHP 
 
15 
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Individual 4 
 
Individual 2 
 
Individual 14 
 
CHP 
 
CHP, SHP 
 
CHP, SHP 
 
CHP, SHP 
 
Public Works, 
Reconstruction, 
Transportation and 
Tourism 
 
 
Individual 4 
 
CHP,SHP 
 1 
Security and 
Intelligence 
 
 
Individual 105 
 
AKP 1 
State Economic 
Enterprises 
 
 
Individual 68 (chair) 
 
Individual 64 
 
Individual 16 
 
 
Individual 98 
 
Individual 30 
 
Individual 2 
 
Individual 55 
 
Individual 92 
 
Individual 106 
 
 
ANAP 
 
ANAP 
 
ANAP, 
Indep. 
 
CHP 
 
CHP 
 
CHP,SHP 
 
DYP 
 
DSP 
 
DSP,CHP 
 
9 
 
3.3. A Summary of Findings and Some Further Remarks: 
1. To explore politically connected firms, in this study, the board of the directors of 694 
firms in Stock Market Ġstanbul between 1998 and 2015 are examined to find out 
parliamentarians in 18
th
-24
th
 Legislative Terms from 1987 to 2015. 
2. Total number of politically connected firms is 125, which constitutes 18 % of the 
total firms. This is more than 1 firm that Faccio finds out in her discussion of politically 
connected firms in Turkey.  
3. Politically connected firms exist in every year. Despite lack of data for 2000 and 
2001 about individuals who are at the parliament and at the board of the directors at the 
same time, the ratio of politically connected firms to the total number of firms changes 
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only very slightly. Therefore one should say that connections always do exist and 
instead of a significant break with the past; what we have is a continuity for the period 
examined in this study. 
4. The connected firms are mostly in financial, manufacturing and wholesale sectors. In 
the Stock Market of Ġstanbul, the number of firms in manufacturing firms is more than 
the ones in the financial sector. What comes out of the connections is the opposite. It is 
the financial sector having most connections. The manufacturing sector is the second 
one.  
5.Most of politically connected firms are connected either with ANAP and/or AKP. 
There are also connected firms with CHP, DYP, FP, and SHP. Having more firms 
connected to right wing parties could be parallel to Buğra’s emphasis on the use of 
religion as a network capital by right wing parties.  
6.There are 112 politically connected individuals. Among them,65 are first in the 
TGNA and then in board of directors, 24 are in board of directors and in the parliament 
at the same time. 23 of them are first in board of directors and later in the 
parliament.This study encompasses the period after 1998, but according to the web site 
of TGNA, there are many parliamentarians served in the board of the directors before 
that date. Therefore the number of connections is probably higher than what I have 
found by using the data of Stock Market Ġstanbul. There are 2 people that I cannot 
double check their connections. There are two people under the same name in the board 
of the directors of RAY Sigorta, but I cannot find any source indicating these deputies 
and businessmen are the same people.  
7.There are ministers among the connected individuals. The majority of these ministers 
are Ministers of State. A considerable number of connected individuals serve as 
Ministers of Energy.  
8. Some of the connected individuals have been serving in Committees in the 
parliament; mostly in planning and budget committee. This choice might be related to 
their educational and/or occupational background first. Secondly, they could be 
planning to be more influential in decision-making especially about the sectors that they 
had connections.    
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9. Regarding the backgrounds of parliamentarians, one may assume that having served 
in a high-ranking bureaucratic position is important to be a parliamentarian later. The 
majority of politicians in business had worked as bureaucrats before being deputies. 
10.Before looking at the board of directors of the companies, I checked whether it is 
illegal for a deputy to become a board member of a firm. Because there are countries in 
which direct connections of business with politics are not welcomed. The Brazilian law 
Codigo de Etica, for example, forbids senators to own companies that would benefit 
from a contract with the government. In Ireland office holders are not allowed to have 
any financial interests that might conflict or to be seen as conflict with their 
positions.There are also countries such as Chile, Portugal and South Korea, with 
restrictions on board members
118
. In the US, congress members cannot become the 
members of the board of the directors of the companies. They cannot get more than 5% 
shares. However, according to Turkish laws, there is no limitation to a deputy to 
become a board member of a firm. Deputies can also be shareholders of the firms.
119
 
Having connections with firms does not constitute a legal problem for politicians and 
businessmen.  
11. It is the publicly available data presenting these connections. In fact, neither 
politicians nor businessmen hide their connections. The politically connected firms are 
not shell companies. Here it is interesting to note that the official web site of TGNA 
generally presents more detailed information about the connections of the people than 
the Yearbooks of Stock Exchange Istanbul. In the biographies of parliamentarians 
available on TGNA’s web site, there are many connections belonging to the period 
before 1998, and there are many connections without clear starting dates. One can argue 
that no matter if it is the deputies or the secretary of TGNA preparing these biographies, 
“having connections” tends to be important in Turkey’s political culture. It is not 
something to be hidden, and it is in fact something to be displayed to the audience. It 
might even be “something to be proud of” as “a sign of success,” a proof of their 
“intellect and talents” that they used or the things that they “sacrificed” for becoming “a 
representative of the Nation.”  
 
                                                          
118Faccio, 2006, p. 380 
119"Hem milletvekili hem yatırımcı olunabilir mi?"http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/20486137.asp; Bayraktar: 
ġirketimizi canlandırmaya çalıĢıyorum, iĢ arıyorum 
 http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/27679848.asp 
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CONCLUSION: 
Since this is a descriptive study, my first and foremost goal was to state direct 
connections between politics and business. The analysis of the Stock Market Istanbul 
data shows that there are politically connected firms Turkey and the number of 
connected firms has slightly increased between 1998 and 2015. The data set I have used 
is incomplete for 2009, so one should say that the results may not be accurate. The 
missing information can be completed from other sources such as 2009 Activity Reports 
of the firms. For the period before 1998, however, Daily Bulletins of Stock Exchange 
since 1985 are convenient to compare the level of connectedness across years.  
In fact, analyzing politically connected firms through the board of the directors 
can be just one part of the analysis of the politically connected firms; there are probably 
more politically connected firms that do not appear on my findings or my data. Here in 
this part, I have concluded with more methods to explore politically connected firms in 
Turkey. 
As Buğra argues, in Turkish case owners of the firms are more important in the 
case of ruling and giving decisions about the firms. Therefore looking at the 
shareholders who have considerable voting right in management of the firm makes 
sense. In fact, some direct connections cannot be found through the board members. For 
example Vahit Kiler, the owner of Kiler Holding, is one of the shareholders. He was not 
a member of the directors; therefore he is not within the scope of this study. However he 
served as AKP deputy from 2007-2015.
120
 This study did not count him as politically 
connected since it is not him but his family sitting in the board of the directors despite 
the fact that he is a connected individual. In addition, a general directors and CEOs of 
the firms and their connections might be important for understanding the connectedness 
of the firms. 
There are many local and/or small firms which are not traded in Stock Exchage 
Istanbul. Therefore another method of investigating direct connections is to look at the 
firms which are not on the stock market. Any firms’ connection partys’ local branches 
deserves attention as well. For example the provincial vice chairman of Ġzmir AKP 
                                                          
120TBMM Vahit Kiler ÖzgeçmiĢ, 
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/milletvekillerimiz_sd.bilgi?p_donem=24&p_sicil=6266; Ak Parti Milletveki 
Berat Albayrak Kimdir? Kaç YaĢındadır? http://www.vatandanhaber.com/haber/1660/ak-parti-milletvekili-berat-
albayrak-kimdir-kac-yasindadir.html 
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branch, Semih Pakdemirli became a board member of Turkcell. Although he run for 
deputy elections from Ġzmir, he failed to be elected.  His familial ties are also important 
for showing his direct connections. His father was  ANAP deputy, Minister of 
Transport, Minister of Finance and Deputy Prime Minister. 
A way to understand direct connections between local governments and firms 
can be to look at firms making donations to local governments and firms providing 
assistance to local governments in their social aids by supplying what the parties 
distribute their potential voters. Besides, more specifically, deputy ministers can be 
analyzed since they are not necessarily elected. There are some deputy prime ministers 
directly appointed from business-private sector.  
In my analysis I included only direct connections. Indirect connections, too, are 
enlightening in terms of connections. Family and friendship ties provide other 
connections which cannot be grasped through the members of the board of directors. 
For example, I did not count Çalık Holding as politically connected in my analysis. 
However, the company owns Sabah-ATV media group which is known with its 
closeness to the government. The owner Ahmet Çalık is personally very close to Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan. Most importantly, Erdoğan’s son-in-law, Berat Albayrak, was the 
former CEO of Çalık Holding and in June 2015 elections, he has been elected as a 
deputy of Istanbul.
121
 Another example is Önder Doğu, the husband of Mesut Yılmaz’s 
wife’s sister, who became a member of the board of director of THY. Mesut Yılmaz’s 
lawyer and a friend from military service, his wife’s assistant’s brother all found 
positions in Petrol Ofisi Company.
122
 Turkish media presents abundant information 
about these connections.  
Once connections are set; politically connected firms can be analyzed more 
closely. The relations between connected firms or networks between them –if there are- 
can be investigated. The differences between state owned and privately owned 
companies in terms of their performances can be put forth. Questions as such can be 
answered: Do connected firms perform better than not connected ones? Do state owned 
connected firms perform better than privately-owned firms? Do connected firms have 
higher leverage ratio? Does firm size matter in the number of connections? Do large 
                                                          
121"Benim Damadım ĠĢini Bilir", http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2013/ekonomi/benim-damadim-isini-bilir-268168/,  
122"Bacanak Sancısı,” http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/index/ArsivNews.aspx?id=-265711 
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firms have more connections or less but deeper connections? Some firms are in BIST 
100 and 30 induces. Do top-traded firms in these induces have more connections or not? 
What about the capacity utilization of connected firms in the stock market? Does 
the number of employment change in accordance with connections? Do 
connected firms employ more people before elections in order to be able to 
satisfy politicians to guarantee their reelection? How are connected firms 
influenced by political shocks? Do the connected ones lose more value? Or are 
the firms which are not getting along with parliament affected badly from 
political shocks?   
Like politically connected firms, politically connected individuals can be 
analyzed more closely as well. On the web site of TGNA, parliamentary questions and 
legislative proposals of parliamentarians are available. The activities of politically 
connected individuals can be traced from these documents. Whether or not they are 
pursuing their own interests in relation to the sector that their companies are operating 
can be discovered. Besides, there are influential businessman politicians who were not 
elected as deputies. Besim Tibuk, the chair of LDP is the CEO of Net Holding; Cem 
Boyner and Cem Uzan are owners of some largest firms. The reasons of why these 
businessmen want to be in the parliament and what kind of advantages they could get 
deserve attention. Some businessmen candidates are spending too much money for 
elections both for campaigns and donations. For example in July 7, 2015elections 
candidates usually spent between 400 thousand and 1 million Turkish liras
123
, which is 
higher than the four-year salary of parliamentarians. A very simple cost benefit analysis 
implies the presence of some other incentives in being a parliamentarian which can be 
researched in a detailed way.  
Besides businessmen, there are lawyers, accountants, engineers and bureaucrats 
in the parliament. The occupational backgrounds of parliamentarians can be 
instrumental in providing them business connections. For instance, bureaucrats who 
worked at state institutions such as DPT seem to have many business connections. The 
advantages or disadvantages of having worked in this kind of institutions for creating 
                                                          
123 "500 Milyona 550 koltuk", http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/29232346.asp; "Erken Seçim her milletvekili için 
en az 100 bin lira daha demek" http://m.t24.com.tr/haber/erken-secim-her-milletvekili-icin-en-az-100-bin-lira-daha-
demek,302297; 99 milyon 999 bin 990 dolar bağıĢmıĢ 
 http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/59069/99_milyon_999_bin_990_dolar_bagismis.html 
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business connections can be analyzed. There may be some connections through 
educational/organizational ties as well. Imam Hatip high school or Ġlim Yayma 
Cemiyeti backgrounds can be important criterion for determining some individuals’ 
connections.  Another idea is looking at the connections between military officers and 
business.  
This study has used the databases provided by government authorities. The 
accountability and transparency of these institutions such as PDP, CMB, SPK and Stock 
Exchange Istanbul  needs to be analyzed. The level and amount of information they 
provide is important and in some cases this may depend on the firms. There are some 
firms who do not give their information on a regular basis. Therefore the firms’ 
accountability and transparency can be also significant for finding out connections 
between business and politics.  
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 http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/08/29/t/siyaset/cin.html 
 
Muhalefet isyan etti: O vekile 5 yılda 78 ihale 
 http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/29684373.asp 
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VIP Arpalık, AKP Ballı Maaşlı Şirketlerde Böyle kadrolaştı:
 http://www.zaman.com.tr/ekonomi_vip-arpalik-akp-balli-maasli-sirketlerde
 -boyle-kadrolasti_2274238.html 
 
Turkey biggest lose in global corruption  
 http://www.todayszaman.com/anasayfa_turkey-biggest-loser-in-global 
 -corruption-ranking-survey-shows_366038.html 
 
Us Corruption Transparency Report 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/03/us-corruption-transparency-  
 report-idUSKCN0JH09520141203 
 
G20 leader Turkey sees Biggest hike Corruption  
 http://www.newsweek.com/g20-leader-turkey-sees-biggest-hike-corruption
 -288883. 
 
Turkey Climbs in Global Press Freedom Index 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-climbs-in-global-press-freedom-index-but
 -warned-about-poor-record.aspx?pageID=238&nID=78265&NewsCatID=339. 
 
Büyük Sermaye'den buraya kadar 
 http://haber.sol.org.tr/ekonomi/buyuk-sermayeden-buraya-kadar-haberi-21836 
 
SPK'dan Turkcelle flaş atama 
 http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/24527219.asp;  
 
SPK Turkcell yetkisini aldı 
 http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/23675813.asp; 
 
Turkcell' e iki eski bakan 
  http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/22791079.asp. 
 
Hem milletvekili hem yatırımcı olunabilir mi? 
 http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/20486137.asp;  
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Bayraktar: Şirketimizi canlandırmaya çalışıyorum, iş arıyorum 
  http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/27679848.asp 
 
Türkiye Siyasetinde Tutunamayanlar 
 http://www.yazangenclik.com/turkiye-siyasetinde-tutunamayanlar-5986 
 
TOMA’nın üreticisi Katmerciler’in hisseleri yüzde 10 düştü 
 http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/29229123.asp 
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APPENDIX: Governments in Turkey from 1983 to 2015 
Government Period Prime Minister Party Coalition/Majority 
45 13.12.1983-
21.12.1987 
Turgut Özal ANAP Majority 
46 21.12.1987-
09.11.1989 
Turgut Özal ANAP Majority 
47 09.11.1989-
23.06.1991 
Yıldırım Akbulut ANAP Majority 
48 23.06.1991-
201.11.1991 
Mesut Yılmaz ANAP Majority 
49 20.11.1991-
16.05.1993 
Süleyman Demirel DYP DYP+SHP 
50 25.06.1993-
05.10.1995 
Tansu Çiller DYP DYP+SHP 
51 05.10.1995-
30.10.1995 
Tansu Çiller DYP Minority 
52 30.10.1995-
06.03.1996 
Tansu Çiller DYP DYP+CHP 
53 06.03.1996-
28.06.1996 
Mesut Yılmaz ANAP ANAP+DYP 
54 28.06.1996-
30.06.1997 
Necmettin Erbakan RP RP+DYP 
55 30.06.1997-
11.01.1999 
Mesut Yılmaz ANAP 
ANAP+DSP+DTP and 
Independents 
56 11.01.1999-
28.05.1999 
Bülent Ecevit DSP Minority 
57 28.05.1999-
19.11.2002 
Bülent Ecevit DSP DSP+MHP+ANAP 
58 19.11.2002-
12.03.2003 
Abdullah Gül AKP Majority 
59 14.03.2003-
29.08.2007 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan AKP Majority 
60 29.08.2007-
06.07.2011 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan AKP Majority 
61 06.07.2011-
29.08.2014 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan AKP Majority 
62 29.08.2014- Ahmet Davutoğlu AKP Majority 
 
